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FUSION VOTING AND THE NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION:  
A REACTION TO NEW JERSEY’S PARTISAN  
POLITICAL CULTURE 
Jeffrey Mongiello∗ 
 
Only by breaking the hold of the Democratic and Republican 
mandarins on the governor’s office and putting a rein on their 
power will the state have any hope for the kind of change needed 
to halt its downward economic, political and ethical spiral.  New 
Jersey needs radical change in Trenton.  Neither of the major 
parties is likely to provide it. [An independent candidate’s] elec-
tion would send shock waves through New Jersey’s ossified politi-
cal system and, we believe, provide a start in a new direction.  It 
would signal the entrenched leadership of both parties and the 
interest groups they regularly represent that an ill-served and an-
gry electorate demands something better.
1
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2009, New Jersey’s largest newspaper endorsed an indepen-
dent candidate for governor—not as an emphatic statement of sup-
port for his policies, or as a rejection of the proposals (or lack the-
reof) of the Democratic and Republican candidates, but rather as a 
strong denunciation of the two major parties themselves and the poli-
tics they represent in New Jersey.
2
  The editorial identified a disillu-
sioned electorate unsatisfied with the present state of affairs—a polit-
ical system stuck in an ineffective status quo at the hands of the two 
major parties.
3
  In a state where unaffiliated voters represent the 
 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2011, Seton Hall University School of Law; M.P.P. 2006, 
B.A. 2005, University of Maryland.  Thank you to Professor John Wefing for his in-
sightful advice and guidance and to Charlie Wilkes for his helpful comments and as-
sistance. 
 1 Editorial, Star-Ledger Endorses Independent Chris Daggett for N.J. Governor, STAR-
LEDGER, Oct. 11, 2009, at 22. 
 2 See id. (“The newspaper’s decision is less a rejection of [the Democratic Gover-
nor and the Republican candidate] than a repudiation of the parties they represent, 
both of which have forfeited any claim to the trust and confidence of the people of 
New Jersey.  They share responsibility for the state’s current plight.”). 
 3 Id. 
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strongest voting bloc, outnumbering both Democrats and Republi-
cans,
4
 the editorial claimed it was time for the voters to vote for an 
independent and send a strong message through the ballot to the two 
major parties—that politics as usual must not continue.
5
  New Jersey’s 
2009 gubernatorial election was an impetus for change—a significant 
opportunity for voters to reject the previous failures of the two major 
parties and demand a new course of action in the state.
6
  The 2009 
gubernatorial election demonstrates that New Jersey voters thirst for 
political alternatives.
7
 
The problem facing independent and third party candidates is 
that voters believe a vote for independents and third parties is a waste 
of a vote.
8
  These voters are wary of casting a ballot for a candidate 
who, most likely, has little chance of winning the election and whose 
contribution to the election may be the role of spoiler—tipping the 
 
 4 See N.J. DEP’T OF STATE—DIV. OF ELECTIONS, STATEWIDE VOTER REGISTRATION 
SUMMARY (Nov. 2, 2009), available at http://www.state.nj.us/state/elections/election-
results/voter-summary-by-county-110209.pdf. 
 5 See Editorial, supra note 1, at 22. 
 6 See id.  Leading up to election day, Independent candidate, Chris Daggett 
polled as high as 20% and his popularity was largely viewed as a rebuke by the voters 
of the two major parties and their candidates.  See RUTGERS-EAGLETON INST. OF 
POLITICS, CORZINE MAY BE OPENING UP SOME SPACE DAGGETT GAINING THOUGH STILL 
WELL BEHIND 1–2 (2009), available at http://eagletonpoll.rutgers.edu/polls/ 
release_10-22-09.pdf. 
 7 See David M. Halbfinger, Independent Candidate Stirs up the Governor’s Race in New 
Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2009, at A17; Max Pizarro, The Daggett Factor Dominates 
Operatives Attention, POLITICKERNJ.COM (Oct. 21, 2009, 3:16 PM), 
http://www.politickernj.com/max/34348/daggett-factor-dominates-operatives-
attention.   
Polling before the election showed a strong voter dissatisfaction with the current 
state of New Jersey politics, particularly with what voters viewed as the ineffective and 
tone-deaf political parties.  Only about one third of voters who supported either the 
Democrat or Republican candidate “strongly” did so; 30% of those who said they 
would support either the Democrat or Republican stated they will because they “dis-
like the other candidates.”  See N.Y. TIMES, OCTOBER 15, 2009 POLL OF NEW JERSEY, at 4 
question 15 (2009), available at http://documents.nytimes.com/the-new-york-times-
new-jersey-poll#p=4.  
 8 See Stanley Chang, Updating the Electoral College: The National Popular Vote Legisla-
tion, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 205, 224 (2007); see also Elissa Berger, Note, A Party that 
Won’t Spoil: Minor Parties, State Constitutions and Fusion Voting, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1381, 
1383–84 (2005).   
Daggett’s final vote of 5.7% was less than the final margin of victory but signifi-
cantly lower than what he had been polling at in the weeks before the election.  The 
large drop off from polling support to votes at the ballot demonstrates that while 
New Jersey voters crave an alternative, when push comes to shove they will only vote 
for someone they perceive as capable of winning.  See Josh Margolin & Claire Hei-
ninger, It’s Christie Hungry for Change, Voters Ditch Corzine, STAR-LEDGER, Nov. 4, 2009, 
at 1.  
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result of the election from one major party candidate to the other.
9
  
Voters who may consider voting for alternative candidates are gener-
ally dissatisfied with the politics or policies of the two major parties 
and wish to send a message through the ballot.
10
  As a result, the cur-
rent two-party system diminishes the message of minor parties, and 
they are unable to sustain themselves.
11
  Thus the opinions and con-
cerns of voters clamoring for a change from the two major parties 
largely go unheard and unanswered. 
Fusion voting, otherwise known as cross-nomination or multiple-
party nomination, is a mechanism that will allow New Jersey voters to 
send direct and powerful messages to candidates and public officials 
and demand action on important public policy issues.  Fusion voting, 
which was a common and effective practice at the end of the nine-
teenth century and into the early-twentieth century,
12
 allows a candi-
date to receive the nominations of more than one political party, 
usually a major party and a minor party, and to appear on the ballot 
on each party line.
13
  The total votes of each party is calculated and a 
candidate cross-nominated by multiple parties has all the votes from 
each party line combined to determine his final vote total.
14
  At the 
general election, voters thus have the opportunity to express their po-
litical messages by voting for a minor party that represents their views, 
while simultaneously influencing the outcome of the election by vot-
ing for a major party candidate who has a chance of winning. 
Presently, New Jersey, as well as forty-two other states and the 
District of Columbia, prohibits fusion voting.
15
  Proponents of fusion 
argue that anti-fusion laws burden parties’ and voters’ rights of free 
association and expression.
16
  In 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court 
upheld Minnesota’s anti-fusion statute against a constitutional chal-
lenge that the ban violated a party’s right to freely associate pursuant 
 
 9 See Berger, supra note 8, at 1381–83. 
 10 See id. at 1383. 
 11 See id. 
 12 See generally Peter H. Argersinger, “A Place on the Ballot”: Fusion Politics and Anti-
fusion Laws, 85 AM. HIST. REV. 287 (1980); see also discussion infra Part II.B. 
 13 See Argersinger, supra note 12, at 288. 
 14 William R. Kirschner, Note, Fusion and the Associational Rights of Minor Political 
Parties, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 683, 687 (1995). 
 15 ADAM MORSE & J.J. GASS, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, MORE CHOICES, MORE 
VOICES: A PRIMER ON FUSION 1, 3 (2006), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/ 
page/-/d/download_file_39345.pdf. 
 16 See Brief for Respondent at *30–34, Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 
520 U.S. 351 (1997) (No. 95-1608), 1996 WL 501955. 
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to the First Amendment.
17
  Therefore, a successful challenge to anti-
fusion laws must raise state constitutional arguments alleging a viola-
tion of either the expressive and associational rights of political par-
ties, candidates and voters, or the right to vote.
18
 
This Comment analyzes the constitutionality of New Jersey’s ban 
on fusion voting.
19
  Given New Jersey’s broad constitutional protec-
tions of associational and expressive rights,
20
 this Comment concludes 
that New Jersey’s anti-fusion law is unconstitutional.  The law violates 
the associational rights of candidates and minor parties and the ex-
pressive rights of voters and minor parties enshrined in Article I, pa-
ragraphs 6 and 18 of the New Jersey Constitution.
21
  The fusion ban, 
however, does not unconstitutionally infringe upon a voter’s right to 
vote. 
Part II of the Comment will discuss the history of fusion in the 
United States and New Jersey, as well as the current state of fusion 
voting after the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Timmons 
v. Twin Cities New Area Party.  Part III will discuss why the New Jersey 
Supreme Court must conduct an independent analysis on state con-
stitutional grounds, as opposed to relying on the federal precedent 
that Timmons established.  Part IV will use a balancing test to deter-
mine whether New Jersey’s legitimate interests in banning fusion 
outweigh the associational and expressive rights of political parties, 
 
 17 See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997); see also discus-
sion infra Part II.D. 
 18 See generally Berger, supra note 8 (arguing that anti-fusion laws are susceptible 
to state constitutional challenges despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Tim-
mons).  The Supreme Court did not consider fusion voting as a constitutionally pro-
tected exercise of parties’ and voters’ expressive rights given its jurisprudence declar-
ing no First Amendment right for a voter to express a message through the act of 
voting.  See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441–42 (1992); Adam Winkler, Note, 
Expressive Voting, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 330, 334–38 (1993). 
 19 New Jersey does not explicitly ban fusion in a single statutory provision.  This 
Comment treats the collection of election laws that effectively prohibit the practice 
of fusion voting as one general ban.  See New Jersey anti-fusion statutes cited infra 
note 80 and the accompanying text.  Although this Comment analyzes New Jersey’s 
anti-fusion law pursuant to its state constitution, many other states have similarly 
worded provisions in their own state constitutions.  
 20 See discussion infra Part III.B.1–2. 
 21 N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 6 protecting freedom of speech and the press, states, in 
part, “[e]very person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all sub-
jects, being responsible for the abuse of that right.  No law shall be passed to restrain 
or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press.”  N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 18, protect-
ing the right of assembly and to petition for redress of grievances, states, “[t]he 
people have the right freely to assemble together, to consult for the common good, 
to make known their opinions to their representatives, and to petition for redress of 
grievances.” 
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voters and candidates,
22
 or the electorate’s right to vote.
23
  Part V pro-
poses a model statute that the New Jersey Legislature should enact, 
when the fusion ban is found unconstitutional, that protects the 
rights of political parties and voters while reasonably regulating the 
practice in New Jersey. 
II. FUSION VOTING: AN OVERVIEW 
A. What is Fusion Voting—Policies and Benefits 
Fusion is the process by which a candidate for office receives the 
nomination of more than one party and appears on the ballot on 
multiple party lines.
24
  A voter has a choice of selecting on which line 
to vote for the candidate.  The number of votes that a candidate rece-
ives, across all party lines, are added together to determine the can-
didate’s final vote total.
25
 
Calculating the total number of votes that a candidate receives 
on a given party line is imperative to fusion voting because it demon-
strates the amount of support a candidate has from that party.
26
  A 
successful third party that provides strong support for a major party 
candidate on its party ballot line will have a grateful elected official 
who is amenable to the ideas of the minor party, providing third par-
 
 22 See id. art. I, para. 6 (free speech provision); id. art. I , para. 18 (free assembly 
provision). 
 23 See id. art. II, sec. I, para. 3 (“Every citizen of the United States, of the age of l8 
years, who shall have been a resident of this State and of the county in which he 
claims his vote 30 days, next before the election, shall be entitled to vote for all offic-
ers that now are or hereafter may be elective by the people, and upon all questions 
which may be submitted to a vote of the people.”). 
 24 See Argersinger, supra note 12, at 288.  
 25 See Note, Fusion Candidacies, Disaggregation, and Freedom of Association, 109 HARV. 
L. REV. 1302, 1305 n.17 (1996) [hereinafter Fusion Candidacies].  
 26 This is best evidenced by elections result in New York, which has had the most 
active fusion voting system this century.  See generally Brief of the Conservative Party of 
New York and Liberal Party of New York as Amici Curiae supporting Respondent at 
*6–15, Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997) (No. 95-1608), 
1996 WL 501925.  Presidents Franklin Delano Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy, and Ro-
nald Regan carried the state of New York, in at least a small part, because of the fu-
sion tickets in which they participated.  See Kirschner, supra note 14, at 683.  New 
York City Mayors Fiorello LaGuardia and Rudy Giuliani had similar experiences with 
fusion tickets.  See id.  Mayor Giuliani won the 1993 mayoral election running on a 
fusion ballot of the Republican and Liberal Parties.  His victory margin was less than 
the number of votes from the Liberal Party line on the ballot.  Id.  Another notable 
beneficiary of fusion voting was California Governor Earl Warren who benefited 
from fusion in three gubernatorial elections.  Id. (citing Robert J. Pritchell, The Elec-
toral System and Voting Behavior: The Case of California’s Cross-Filing, 12 W. POL. Q. 459, 
474 (1959)). 
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ty members with representation that they previously did not have
27
 
and thereby opening up avenues of influence for the minor parties to 
shape public policy.
28
  Minor parties wield even more influence with 
elected candidates when their ballot line provides a level of voter 
support higher than the margin of victory in the election—essentially 
signaling to the official that he would have lost the election if not for 
the minor party’s votes.
29
  Counting the votes on each party line sepa-
rately demonstrates the importance of party nominations on a ballot 
as a means of engaging in political speech.
30
 
Without fusion, minor parties are in the difficult position of ei-
ther nominating a candidate who will struggle to gain support, likely 
lose and who can serve as a spoiler, or not nominating a candidate at 
all and endorsing a major party candidate.
31
  Neither option supports 
the long-term success, stability, and political influence of a minor par-
ty.
32
  Voters want to vote for a candidate who at least has a legitimate 
chance of winning, but minor parties cannot cater to that desire.
33
 
A fusion system gives a minor party the opportunity to influence 
the outcome of elections by nominating a major party candidate.  
Cross-nominations allow a party to endorse a candidate with a chance 
 
 27 See Fusion Candidacies, supra note 25, at 1309–10. 
 28 See Berger, supra note 8, at 1384 n.17.  Demonstrating that a party (and its plat-
form) has electoral support through a strong vote total on the party line can lead the 
winning candidate to recognize and endorse the party’s policies.  New York State’s 
experience shows that success at the polls with fusion tickets can lead to influence 
over politicians in office.  See id. at 1392 (discussing the success of the Conservative 
Party in influencing Republican officials on morality issues and the Working Families 
Party in achieving a living-wage provision). 
 29 See Patriot Party v. Alleghany Cnty. Dep’t of Elections, 95 F.3d 253, 261 (3d Cir. 
1996).  Though this is an oversimplification of the issue since some of the minor par-
ty voters would probably vote for the major party candidate, while some voters would 
just stay home.  Yet the strong signal to the candidate is delivered anyway.  
 30 See Fusion Candidacies, supra note 25, at 1305 n.18. 
 31 See Kirschner, supra note 14, at 700; Berger, supra note 8, at 1383. 
 32 See McKenna v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 73 F.3d 196, 199 (8th Cir. 1996) 
(nominating winning candidates is vital to the success of a political party).  “The risk 
of ‘spoiling’ or ‘wasting votes,’ however, makes it hard for minor parties and inde-
pendent candidates to consistently secure voters’ support at the ballot box, even if 
voters remain committed to the party and candidate’s  ideology.”  Berger, supra note 
8, at 1383 (explaining that a minor party rarely runs their own candidate in more 
than two election cycles (citing STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE ET AL., THIRD PARTIES IN 
AMERICA 81, 174–75 (2d ed. 1996)).  But see James Gray Pope, Fusion, Timmons v. 
Twin Cities Area New Party, and the Future of Third Parties in the United States, 50 
RUTGERS L. REV. 473, 500–01 (1998) (arguing that minor parties may “lose their iden-
tity and sense of purpose when they fuse with major parties” and minor parties may 
have more power and influence in election systems that ban fusion than they would 
have if the Supreme Court in Timmons ruled that fusion bans were unconstitutional). 
 33 See Kirschner, supra note 14, at 700. 
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of winning the election, while simultaneously giving voters the oppor-
tunity to demonstrate support for the party’s beliefs and policies 
without having to worry about a “wasted vote” or “spoiling” the elec-
tion.
34
  Furthermore, minor parties presently rely heavily on an indi-
vidual candidate’s appeal and not necessarily on the party’s ideology 
and beliefs.
35
  Fusion voting removes the candidate-centric nature of 
minor parties and pushes the focus onto a party’s platform. 
Fusion voting presents the opportunity for minor parties to ef-
fectively and consistently play a substantial role in the electoral 
process.
36
  A minor party can develop into a force in the political and 
electoral process by helping cross-nominated candidates win elec-
tions.
37
  By cross-nominating, minor parties have the ability to estab-
lish coalitions with major parties to craft a strategy to effectively ex-
press their political message and build support for their policies.  
These coalitions can expand political opportunity for voters who are 
dissatisfied with the two major parties.
38
  Fusion voting allows voters 
and parties to express their true political choices and discontent with 
the two-party system.
39
  A fusion system would likely increase voter 
participation because more voters’ beliefs would be represented by a 
candidate with a chance of winning.
40
 
The benefits of fusion voting are not theoretical.  Fusion systems 
were prevalent during the Progressive Era and the effects and results 
 
 34 Berger, supra note 8, at 1384 (noting that “fusion voting makes one vote count 
twice—first it sends a message about the issues the voter cares about and then it 
helps elect a candidate”). 
 35 See Kirschner, supra note 14, at 703 (citing STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE ET AL., THIRD 
PARTIES IN AMERICA: CITIZEN RESPONSE TO MAJOR PARTY FAILURE 80–81 (1984)).  This 
leads to a situation where the most successful third party candidates, who can break 
through and appeal to the public, are either very wealthy or celebrities.  See Berger, 
supra note 8, at 1386. 
 36 See Kirschner, supra note 14, at 683–84. 
 37 See Julie Bosman & Kareem Fahim, Young and Active, the Working Families Party 
Shows Muscle in the Primaries, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2009, at A28 (reporting that in New 
York State, the nascent Working Families Party has garnered success in a short period 
of time through its effective use of cross-nomination and providing strong voter sup-
port for its fusion candidates). 
 38 See Fusion Candidacies, supra note 25, at 1304.  A fusion system will ensure that 
more views and voters are represented by the winning party in governing and will 
create stronger and diverse opposition.  Fusion gives the major party that is currently 
out of power the ability to form political alliances and thus more effectively challenge 
the major party in power.  See Kirschner, supra note 14, at 712 (citing Swamp v. Ken-
nedy, 950 F.2d 383, 388 (7th Cir. 1991) (Ripple, J., dissenting from denial of rehear-
ing en banc)). 
 39 Kirschner, supra note 14, at 701, 720. 
 40 See id. at 720; Argersinger, supra note 12, at 289. 
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of this mechanism can be seen from its actual electoral use during 
the late-nineteenth century. 
B. History of Fusion Voting 
Fusion voting was an active and popular mechanism of Progres-
sive Era politics.
41
  Third parties thrived during this time because 
“[fusion] helped maintain a significant third party tradition by gua-
ranteeing that dissenters’ votes could be more than symbolic protest, 
that their leaders could gain office, and that their demands might be 
heard.”
42
  Less than 5% of a statewide vote was often sufficient for a 
minor party to be the tipping point in the balance of power in nar-
rowly decided elections.
43
  The out-of-power major party and a minor 
party used fusion successfully to form an alliance united against the 
dominant party controlling the government.
44
  This success ultimately 
led to fusion’s downfall because the major party controlling the legis-
lature sought to decrease the power of the opposition—giving rise to 
the prohibition of fusion voting.
45
 
States began to prohibit fusion systems in the late-1800s and ear-
ly-1900s.
46
  The new bans on cross-nominations intended to limit and 
restrict the ability and freedom of minor political parties to thrive, as 
well as decrease the power of the major party in the opposition.
47
  
Under the “mild cover of procedural reform” and good government, 
the Republican Party in state legislatures across the country enacted 
electoral reforms that were a “conscious effort to shape the political 
arena by disrupting opposition parties, revising traditional campaign 
 
 41 See Argersinger, supra note 12, at 288.  In the late-nineteenth century, fusion 
voting was such a fixture of the political system of the time that there was either a full 
or partial fusion ticket on the ballot in almost every election in the Midwest and 
West.  Id.  Fusion voting during this time was largely a local and state issue, not prac-
ticed during national elections.  See id. at 296. 
 42 Id. at 288–89. 
 43 See id. at 296–99. 
 44 Id. at 288. In Midwestern and Western states, fusion tickets brought together 
the out-of-power Democratic Party and the minor Populist Party in an alliance 
against the Republican Party, which generally controlled these state legislatures.  Id. 
 45 See id. at 290–94. 
 46 Kirschner, supra note 14, at 687.  In the ten years between 1897 and 1907, thir-
teen state legislatures passed anti-fusion laws.  Id. at 688. 
 47 Id.  Anti-fusion laws were “enacted by politicians who deliberately sought to 
protect or advance their own interests by manipulating the rules of the game.”  Ar-
gersinger, supra note 12, at 306. 
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and voting practices, and ensuring Republican hegemony” by ban-
ning the practice of fusion voting.
48
 
The advent of the Australian ballot system
49
 and one uniform 
ballot increased the ability of the major party in power to restrict the 
power and support of other parties—the ballot itself was used as a 
tool to ban fusion.
50
  The simplest ballot rule to restrict fusion was in-
stituting a limit that a candidate’s name could appear only once on a 
ballot.
51
  Before states had one official state ballot, each party had its 
own physical ballot it distributed to voters and a voter could vote for a 
cross-nominated candidate on his own party’s ballot.
52
 
The limit of a candidate appearing only once on the ballot 
would force some party members in a fusion alliance to vote for a 
candidate under a different party’s banner, which many voters were 
loath to do.
53
  The practice of an official ballot listing a candidate’s 
name “but once”
54
 on the ballot was described as a “‘scheme to put 
the voters in a straight jacket’”
55
 and “‘its only purpose [was] to pre-
 
 48 Argersinger, supra note 12, at 288.  “Ending the effective cooperation of Dem-
ocrats and third party groups was both the primary goal and the major result of these 
efforts.”  Id. at 303. 
 49 Under the Australian ballot system, “an official ballot, containing the names of 
all the candidates legally nominated by all the parties, was printed at public expense 
and distributed by public officials at polling places.”  Timmons v. Twin Cities Area 
New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 356 (1997).  Prior to the adoption of the system in the late-
1800’s, the parties distributed ballots to voters or voters produced their own ballots.  
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 446 (1992) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  The Australi-
an ballot system reduced corruption and created privacy for voters.  See Berger, supra 
note 8, at 1388.  For a detailed history of the adoption of the Australian ballot system, 
see generally John C. Fortier & Norman J. Ornstein, The Absentee Ballot and the Secret 
Ballot: Challenges for Election Reform, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 483, 486–91 (2003). 
 50 Argersinger, supra note 12, at 291–92. 
 51 Id. at 291.  In fact, the law mandating that a candidate’s name could only ap-
pear but once on the ballot, was such a subtle attack on fusion, Oregon Democrats 
did not realize its implications until a year after the law passed and the party tried to 
cross-nominate with the Populist Party.  Id. at 293. 
 52 Id. at 291–92. 
 53 Id.  In Oregon and Minnesota, in the elections immediately following the ban, 
when Democrat and Populist parties tried to fuse to beat the Republican candidate 
but were unable to do so, the combined vote for the individual Democrat and Popul-
ist would have defeated the Republican candidate by a significant margin; however, 
the Republican won the election as the popular vote winner.  Id. at 293–95. 
 54 New Jersey adopted the language in 1922, which remains in effect today.  1922 
N.J. Sess. Law, c. 242, sec. 32, at p. 446–47; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:14-2 (West 2010).  
 55 Argersinger, supra note 12, at 292 (quoting State ex rel. Christy v. Stein, 53 N.W. 
999, 1003 (Neb. 1892)). 
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vent fusion’ . . . [and] to interfere with ‘the freedom of action of the 
party . . . [and] of the citizens who compose that party.’”
56
 
The history of anti-fusion laws demonstrates the dominant polit-
ical party’s intent to exercise its political will and shape electoral sta-
tutes for the sole purpose of preventing opposing parties from coa-
lescing and threatening its control on government.
57
  The decline in 
fusion voting was not an “‘unintended consequence’ of ballot change 
but rather resulted from ‘sharp practice.’  The institutional change 
had been purposely designed to exploit the observed behavioral pat-
terns in the political culture and did not represent some abstract or 
disinterested impulse towards ‘reform.’”
58
  Despite the less-than-pure 
intent of the prohibition, legal challenges to the anti-fusion statutes 
were overwhelmingly unsuccessful.
59
  Litigation as a means to revive 
fusion, however, gained support in the 1990s with mixed success
60
 un-
til the issue ultimately reached the United States Supreme Court for 
adjudication.
61
 
C. Political Parties and Fusion Voting in New Jersey 
1. “Political Party” Is Statutorily Defined in New Jersey 
The term, “political party,” has a specific statutory definition in 
New Jersey with only two parties achieving the designation.  In New 
 
 56 Id. (quoting State ex rel. Runge v. Anderson, 76 N.W. 482, 487 (Wisc. 1898) 
(Winslow, J., dissenting)).  Justice Winslow continued on to note that the single list-
ing of a candidate’s name would not prevent illegal votes, end corruption, or “pre-
serve the purity of the ballot,” for which the State argued the anti-fusion legislation 
was necessary.  Runge, 76 N.W. at 487. 
 57 See Kirschner, supra note 14, at 712 (citing Arserginger, supra note 12, at 290–
92). 
 58 Argersinger, supra note 12, at 295. 
 59 Kirschner, supra note 14, at 689.  See, e.g., Socialist Party v. Uhl, 103 P. 181, 188 
(Cal. 1909); Hennegan v. Geartner, 47 A.2d  393, 396 (Md. 1946); State ex rel. Dunn 
v. Coburn, 168 S.W. 956, 958 (Mo. 1914); State ex rel. Curyea v. Wells, 138 N.W. 165, 
167 (Neb. 1912); State ex rel. Thatcher v. Brodigan, 142 P. 520, 522−23 (Nev. 1914); 
Appeal of Magazzu, 49 A.2d 411, 412 (Pa. 1946); State ex rel. Runge v. Anderson, 76 
N.W. 482, 486 (Wis. 1898).  But see State ex rel. Murphy v. Curry, 70 P. 461, 461 (Cal. 
1902); In re City Clerk of Paterson, 88 A. 694, 695 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1913); In re Hopper 
v. Britt, 96 N.E. 371, 375 (N.Y. 1911). 
 60 See, e.g., Stewart v. Taylor 104 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 1997) (upholding anti-fusion 
law); Twin Cities Area New Party v. McKenna, 73 F.3d 196 (8th Cir. 1996) (striking 
down anti-fusion laws); Patriot Party v. Alleghany Cnty. Dep’t of Elections, 95 F.3d 
253 (3d. Cir. 1996) (declaring anti-fusion law unconstitutional on equal protection, 
as well as First Amendment, grounds); Swamp v. Kennedy, 950 F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 
1991) (upholding anti-fusion law). 
 61 Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 356–57 (1997); see dis-
cussion infra Part II.D. 
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Jersey, a “political party” is “a party which, at the election held for all 
of the members of the General Assembly next preceding the holding 
of any primary election held pursuant to [Title 19], polled for mem-
bers of the General Assembly at least 10% of the total vote cast in this 
State.”
62
  This Comment will refer to the statutory political parties as 
“major parties,” which includes the Democratic and Republican par-
ties. 
The benefits of achieving major party status include the ability to 
hold a primary
63
 and gaining access to one of the top spots on the bal-
lot.
64
  At one point, the benefits for major parties also included a sta-
tutory restriction that permitted voters to register as members of ma-
jor parties only and not minor parties, as well as free access for the 
major parties to voter information, while the minor parties had to pay 
for the same information.
65
 
2. New Jersey’s History of Fusion Voting 
In the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, the state of 
New Jersey implicitly, and then explicitly, allowed parties to cross-
nominate candidates.  Prior to 1911, New Jersey implicitly permitted 
fusion because the election code did not expressly prohibit or allow 
the practice.
66
 
In 1911, the New Jersey Legislature passed an election reform 
bill, the Geran Law,
67
 which Governor Woodrow Wilson hailed as a 
 
 62 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:1-1 (West 2010).  
 63 See id. § 19:5-1. 
 64 See id. § 19:14-12. 
 65 The New Jersey Appellate Division declared these two benefits invalid in 2001.  
Council of Alt. Political Parties v. State, 781 A.2d 1041, 1052–53 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2001). 
 66 See JOHN F. REYNOLDS, TESTING DEMOCRACY: ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR AND 
PROGRESSIVE REFORM IN NEW JERSEY, 1880–1920, 44, 93, 170 (1988) (discussing exam-
ples of fusion tickets during various points of New Jersey history).  The lack of a sta-
tutory provision on the issue, though, had nothing to do with the process of fusion 
voting; rather, before 1911, New Jersey did not heavily regulate ballot procedures.  
New Jersey was one of the last states to enact the Australian ballot system imposing a 
standard ballot, which required further State regulation.  Arthur Ludington, Ballot 
Legislation of 1911, 6 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 54, 54 (1912); Arthur Ludington, Election 
Laws: The New Geran Law in New Jersey, 5 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 579, 579–80, 584 (1911) 
(declaring New Jersey’s prior electoral scheme as “one of the most backward and un-
satisfactory in the country”).  
 67 For a background of the Geran Law and its legislative history, see generally, 
Ralph Simpson Boots, A.M., The Direct Primary in New Jersey, 30–38 (May 18, 1917) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University), available at 
http://books.google.com/books?id=lW1DAAAAIAAJ&dq=The%20Direct%20Primar
y%20in%20New%20Jersey&pg=PA30#v=onepage&q&f=false. 
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“‘thoroughgoing reform of the whole electoral process of the 
State.’”
68
  Governor Wilson and the Legislature viewed fusion as such 
an integral means of “‘put[ting] every process of choice directly in 
the hands of the people,’”
69
 that it was expressly provided for in the 
sweeping reform bill.
70
  This broad reform enacted a standardized 
statewide ballot presenting the slates of each party, and provided an 
affirmative mechanism to allow for multiple nominations that empo-
wered the voting public to express their beliefs via their choice of 
candidate and party.
71
  The Geran Law provides an early indication 
that the Legislature viewed the ballot as more than just a means of 
casting a vote, but rather as an expressive tool between candidate, 
party and voter.  When New Jersey first implemented a single official 
State ballot, the Legislature clearly permitted the ballot itself to be 
used for political expression. 
New Jersey’s experiment with fusion voting was short-lived.
72
  In 
the early-1920s, the New Jersey Legislature began to impede the 
growth of minor parties to preserve the strength of the two major 
 
 68 Wilson Scores Again as Lawmakers Quit, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1911, at 3.  The 
thrust of the bill was New Jersey very belatedly adopting the Australian ballot system 
and enacting a single official ballot, after the majority of states had already ended the 
practice of each party having a separate ballot.  See 1911 N.J. Sess. Law, c. 183, sec. 53, 
at p. 313.  See generally Ludington, Ballot Legislation, supra note 66.  The law also con-
tained numerous anti-corruption provisions.  See generally 1911 N.J. Sess. Law, c. 183. 
 69 See Wilson Scores Again as Lawmakers Quit, supra note 68. 
 70 While the rest of the country, particularly Republican-led legislatures, was ban-
ning fusion in the early twentieth century, Governor Woodrow Wilson and the Dem-
ocratic Legislature cut against the grain and enacted a pro-fusion provision as part of 
a comprehensive electoral system reform.  The law was not a classic robust fusion vot-
ing system in the sense that each party nominated a candidate on its own line.  Lu-
dington, Ballot Legislation, supra note 66, at 54; Ludington, The New Geran Law in New 
Jersey, supra note 66, at 584.  It was more of a “fusion-lite” system, similar to the one 
recently enacted by Oregon in 2009, which, in effect, allows multiple parties to no-
minate a candidate, but the candidate only appears on one line on the ballot with all 
the party nominations following his name.  See Editorial, For a More Democratic Oregon, 
THE OREGONIAN, July 7, 2009. 
 71 Specifically, the law contained directions for a candidate who received more 
than one party’s nomination.  1911 N.J. Sess. Law, c. 183, sec. 54, at p. 313. 
Any candidate receiving the nomination of more than one political 
party or group of petitioners may . . . file with the public official 
charged with the duty of printing the ballots a notice directing such 
official in what order the several nominations shall be added to his 
name upon the official ballot . . . . 
Id.  Ludington, Ballot Legislation, supra note 66, at 54; see also In re City Clerk of Pater-
son, 88 A. 694, 695–96 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1913) (ordering the city clerk to place a candi-
date on the ballot as the nominee of both the Republican and Progressive parties be-
cause the law did not forbid it). 
 72 Fusion voting in New Jersey was not popular with certain officials in the major 
parties.  See Republican Opposes Fusion in Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1913, at 16. 
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parties.
73
  In 1921, the Legislature passed two provisions to prohibit 
fusion tickets—the first provision prevented a candidate who had ac-
cepted a primary nomination from engaging in a petition nomi-
nation;
74
 the second prevented any candidate from accepting a peti-
tion nomination if that candidate had already accepted either a 
primary or petition nomination.
75
  The following year, the New Jersey 
Legislature passed a law containing a provision prohibiting one party 
from nominating, as a candidate for office, the nominee of another 
party.
76
  The language explicitly prevented any candidate from receiv-
ing multiple nominations, resulting in the demise of fusion voting in 
New Jersey.
77
 
3. The Current Status of Fusion Voting in New Jersey 
Currently, no party in New Jersey is allowed to nominate a can-
didate for office if that candidate has already accepted another par-
ty’s nomination.
78
  New Jersey expressly prohibits multiple nomi-
nations through the regulation of the election ballot, stating that 
 
 73 For example, in 1920, ballot access for third parties became stricter.  The Leg-
islature passed a law mandating that a party receive 10% of the statewide vote for the 
General Assembly, in order to become a recognized political party pursuant to the 
election laws.  1920 N.J. Sess. Law, c. 349, art. I, sec. 1(i), at p. 616.  Previously, in or-
der to achieve political party status, a party only needed 5% of the vote during the 
prior General Assembly election, but instead of a statewide total, the law only re-
quired the 5% in the specific “territorial district or division.”  1903 N.J. Sess. Law., 
c.248, sec. 3, at p. 606.  The high standard for a third party to achieve official political 
party status is still the law today in New Jersey.  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:1-1 (West 
2010). 
 74 1921 N.J. Sess. Law, c. 196, sec. 59, at p. 551 (“[A]ny such petition shall not 
undertake to nominate any candidate who has accepted the nomination for the pri-
mary for such position.”).  The provision infringed upon fusion because once a ma-
jor party’s candidate accepted a primary nomination, that candidate could not par-
ticipate in a minor party’s petition nomination process.  This provision was the 
precursor to the current N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:13-4. 
 75 1921 N.J. Sess. Law, c. 196, sec. 60, at p. 551 (preventing a candidate from sign-
ing an acceptance of petition nomination “if he has signed an acceptance for the 
primary nomination or any other petition of nomination”).  The provision prevented 
fusion tickets across two-minor parties through petition nominations.  This provision 
was the precursor to the current N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:13-8. 
 76 Assemb. B. 50, 78th Leg. (N.J. 1922) (“An act to amend an act entitled ‘An act 
to regulate elections’”); see also JOURNAL OF THE SEVENTY-EIGHTH SENATE OF THE STATE 
OF NEW JERSEY 634, 717 (1922). 
 77 The law amended the existing election provision to provide that “[t]he name 
of any candidate shall appear but once upon the ballot for the same office.”  1922 
N.J. Sess. Law, c. 242, sec. 32, at p. 447.  
 78 Hand v. Larason, 394 A.2d 163, 165 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978) (“[N]o 
person in New Jersey can legally accept the nomination of more than one party for 
the same office.”). 
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“[t]he name of a candidate shall appear but once upon the ballot for 
the same office.”
79
  New Jersey reinforces this prohibition through 
additional statutes that regulate the nomination process and accep-
tance of nominations.
80
  This Comment will treat all of these statutes 
as one general ban on fusion voting. 
4. Why New Jersey Needs Fusion Voting 
At the end of the nineteenth century, leading into the twentieth 
century, fusion voting was popular with voters as well as the political 
parties.  Its popularity and success stemmed from the political culture 
of the time: 
Voter turnout was at a historic high, rigid party allegiance was 
standard, and straight-ticket voting was the norm.  Partisanship 
was intense, rooted not only in shared values but in hatreds en-
gendered by cultural and sectional conflict.  Changes in party 
control resulted less from voter conversion than from differential 
rates of partisan turnout or from the effect of third parties. . . .  
[E]lections were bitterly contested campaigns in which neither 
major party consistently attracted a majority of the voters.
81
 
 
 79 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:14-2 (West 2010); see supra notes 54–56 and accompanying 
text (discussing the effect of “but once” language of a statute). 
 80 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:13-1 (“Candidates for all public offices to be voted for at 
the general election in this state or in any political division thereof, except electors of 
president and vice president of the United States nominated by the political parties 
at state conventions, shall be nominated directly by petition as hereinafter provided, 
or at the primary for the general election held pursuant to this title.”); id. § 19:13-4 
(“No such petition shall undertake to nominate any candidate who has accepted the 
nomination for the primary for such position.”); id. § 19:13-8 (“No candidate so 
named shall sign such acceptance if he has signed an acceptance for the primary 
nomination or any other petition of nomination under this chapter for such of-
fice.”); id. § 19:23-5 (“Candidates to be voted for at the primary election for the gen-
eral election shall be nominated exclusively by the members of the same political 
party by petition in the manner herein provided.”); id. § 19:23-15  (“No candidate 
who has accepted the nomination by a direct petition of nomination for the general 
election shall sign an acceptance to a petition of nomination for such office for the 
primary election.”); see also id. § 19:14-9 (“indorsed by” provision).   
The “indorsed by” provision provides that if somehow a person receives multiple 
nominations, then that candidate can only select one nomination but may have the 
words “indorsed by” and the other party’s name following the candidate’s name on 
the ballot.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:14-9.  This situation is incredibly rare in New Jersey, 
given the ban on primary candidates from seeking other methods of nomination and 
the prohibition of a candidate from seeking multiple petition candidacies.  The sta-
tute applies in the unique instance when a candidate wins a party’s nomination and 
subsequently wins the write-in vote of another party’s primary.  See, e.g., Hand v. Lara-
son, 394 A.2d 163 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978). 
 81 Argersinger, supra note 12, at 289. 
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The political climate over one-hundred years ago is strikingly similar 
to the highly partisan nature of the electorate and political environ-
ment in New Jersey presently. 
Fusion voting provided a refuge for those dissatisfied with the 
politics and policies of the two major parties.  It allowed voters to ex-
press strong political views without having to either cast a protest vote 
for a candidate unlikely to win or cast a vote for one of two major par-
ty candidates, neither of whom were appealing options.
82
  Given this 
outlet for a significant portion of a discontented electorate, fusion 
voting was widely supported and practiced.
83
  New Jersey’s current po-
litical climate—with its bitterly fought elections, negative campaigns, 
and generally vitriolic political discourse—is ready for a reincarnation 
of fusion voting. 
Most importantly, New Jersey voters do not hold deep ties to ei-
ther of the two major parties.
84
  At the ballot, voters choose between 
the two parties because of a lack of real choice, but the registration 
numbers show that almost half of New Jersey voters prefer to remain 
unaffiliated rather than declare themselves as an official member of 
the Democratic or Republican parties.
85
 
 
 82 Fusion allowed these voters “to register their discontent effectively without di-
rectly supporting a party that represented negative reference groups and rarely of-
fered acceptable policy alternatives.”  Id. at 290. 
 83 See discussion supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text. 
 84 Almost 70% of New Jersey voters are open to a strong independent or minor 
party alternative to the two major parties and approximately 37% would prefer more 
parties than the two that currently dominate New Jersey politics.  Matt Friedman, 
Poll: Daggett Could Do Better with Voters Who Are Tired of the Major Parties, 
POLITICKERNJ.COM (Oct. 26, 2009, 4:01 PM), http://www.politickernj.com/matt-
friedman/34509/poll-daggett-could-do-better-voters-who-are-tired-major-parties (cit-
ing Rutgers-Eagleton poll of 583 likely voters between October 15–20, 2009 with a 
margin of error of plus or minus 4.1%). 
Furthermore, the third party registration numbers support the theory that the 
electorate desires political alternatives.  Between Election Day 2008 and Election Day 
2009 minor party registration increased by 12.6%, while major party registration 
numbers remained largely unchanged.  Michael McDonald, Voter Registration Trends, 
May 2010, POLLSTER.COM (May 11, 2010, 3:47 PM), http://www.pollster.com/ 
blogs/voter_registration_trends_may.php. 
 85 On Election Day 2009, approximately 45% of New Jersey voters were Unaffi-
liated, 34% were members of the Democratic Party and 20% were members of the 
Republican Party.  N.J. DEP’T OF STATE—DIV. OF ELECTIONS, supra note 4; see also Tom 
Hester, Sr., Registered Democrats Outnumber Republicans 1,766,669 to 1,061,899, But 
Dwarfed by N.J.’s Unaffiliated 2,393,679, NEWJERSEYNEWSROOM.COM (Oct. 30, 2009), 
http://www.newjerseynewsroom.com/state/registered-democrats-outnumber-
republicans-1766669-to-1061899-but-dwarfed-by-njs-unaffiliated-2393679.  
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D. Fusion Voting and the First Amendment: Timmons 
In 1997, the United States Supreme Court, in Timmons v. Twin 
Cities Area New Party, held that state election laws that prohibit fusion 
voting do not violate a party’s associational rights pursuant to the 
First Amendment.
86
  The Court’s decision resolved a circuit split be-
tween the Eighth Circuit, which found fusion voting constitutionally 
protected, and the Seventh Circuit, which declared that anti-fusion 
laws did not run afoul of the Constitution.
87
 
In 1994, Andy Dawkins, a Minnesota State Representative, ran 
unopposed in the Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party’s (“DFL”) primary 
for re-election to his seat.
88
  In Minnesota, the DFL is one of two “ma-
jor” parties, along with the Republican Party, according to Minnesota 
state election law.
89
  The New Party,
90
 a minor party in Minnesota, 
voted to nominate Dawkins and met all of the state’s substantive bal-
lot access requirements.
91
  Representative Dawkins accepted the nom-
ination, to which the DFL did not object.
92
  Minnesota prohibits the 
practice of parties cross-nominating a candidate for the same office 
and election officials rejected the New Party’s petition to nominate 
Representative Dawkins, thus preventing him from appearing on the 
 
 86 520 U.S. 351, 356 (1997). 
 87 See Benjamin D. Black, Note, Developments in the State Regulation of Major and 
Minor Political Parties, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 156–60 (1996).  The Eighth Circuit 
ruled that Minnesota’s anti-fusion law violated the associational rights of parties.  
Twin Cities Area New Party v. McKenna, 73 F.3d 196, 200 (8th Cir. 1996).  The Se-
venth Circuit upheld both Wisconsin’s and Indiana’s bans on fusion voting.  Swamp 
v. Kennedy, 950 F.2d 383, 387 (7th Cir. 1991) (upholding Wisconsin’s ban on fu-
sion); Stewart v. Taylor, 104 F.3d 965, 927 (7th Cir. 1997) (upholding Indiana’s ban 
on fusion).  The Third Circuit had declared a Pennsylvania fusion ban unconstitu-
tional as a violation of First Amendment associational rights, as well as Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection rights, because it allowed major parties to cross-
nominate candidates in a limited number of elections, but not minor parties.  Patriot 
Party v. Alleghany Cnty. Dep’t of Elections, 95 F.3d 253, 270 (3d Cir. 1996), aff’d on 
reh’g, Reform Party of Alleghany Cnty. v. Alleghany Cnty. Dep’t of Elections, 174 F.3d 
305 (3d. Cir 1999) (affirming on equal protection grounds after Timmons found no 
First Amendment associational right to fusion). 
 88 Timmons, 520 U.S. at 354; Brief for Respondent, supra note 16, at *1–2. 
 89 See Timmons, 520 U.S. at 354 n.2. 
 90 The New Party stated that its “broad aims are identical to those of more estab-
lished parties: to promote candidates its members judge best represent their views, to 
use the electoral process to advance its program, and to widen its base of support in 
the general electorate.”  Brief for Respondent, supra note 16, at *1–2.  The New Par-
ty’s electoral strategy used a combination of running candidates that were exclusively 
New Party nominees and nominating consenting candidates of other parties.  Id. at 
*2. 
 91 Timmons, 520 U.S. at 354; Brief for Respondent, supra note 16, at *2. 
 92 Brief of Respondent, supra note 16, at *2. 
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ballot under the New Party column.
93
  The New Party filed suit, alleg-
ing that the anti-fusion statute violated the party’s associational rights 
protected by the First Amendment.
94
 
The Supreme Court declared that anti-fusion statutes do not vi-
olate First Amendment associational rights.
95
  The Court acknowl-
edged that the anti-fusion law inhibited the New Party’s associational 
rights but found that the burden on the party was “not severe.”
96
  
When a party suffers a “lesser burden,” the Court does not require 
proof that that regulation is “narrowly tailored and advance[s] a 
compelling state interest.”
97
  Instead, the Court applies a “less exact-
ing review” under which Minnesota had to demonstrate “important 
regulatory interests” that are “sufficiently weighty” to justify “reasona-
ble, nondiscriminatory restrictions.”
98
  The majority reasoned that the 
State had legitimate interests to avoid voter confusion, promote com-
petition among candidates, prevent any distortions and manipula-
tions of the electoral process or ballot, discourage party splintering 
and unrestrained factionalism, and preserve the stability of the two-
party system.
99
  These reasonable State interests were sufficient to jus-
tify the lesser burden on the New Party’s associational rights.
100
 
In dissent, Justice Stevens found that the anti-fusion statute did 
impose a severe burden on the New Party and that the State did not 
provide sufficient justification for infringing upon the party’s associa-
tional rights.
101
  Justice Stevens argued that political parties have a 
First Amendment right “to have their candidate’s name appear on 
 
 93 Timmons, 520 U.S. at 354–55; Brief for Respondent, supra note 16, at *2. 
 94 The district court found in favor of Minnesota, upholding the statute.  Twin 
Cities Area New Party v. McKenna, 863 F. Supp. 988, 994 (D. Minn. 1994).  The 
Eighth Circuit reversed, concluding that the anti-fusion law posed a serious burden 
upon the New Party and that the state’s law was overly broad and not narrowly tai-
lored to achieve the State’s interests.  Twin Cities Area New Party v. McKenna, 73 
F.3d 196, 200 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 95 Timmons, 520 U.S. at 356. 
 96 Id. at 362–64. 
 97 See id. at 358–60. 
 98 Id. at 358–59 (internal quotations omitted). 
 99 Id. at 364. 
 100 See id. at 369–70. 
 101 Timmons, 520 U.S. at 370–71 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Justice Stevens argued 
that the majority should not have considered preserving the two-party system as a 
state interest since the State did not raise this justification below.  Id. at 377.  Justice 
Souter also dissented, joining in part with Justice Stevens; however, Justice Souter 
would have accepted preserving the two-party system as a State interest provided that 
Minnesota had shown evidence that fusion voting would indeed harm and damage 
the two-party structure, which the State had not demonstrated.  Id. at 382–84 (Sou-
ter, J., dissenting). 
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the ballot despite the fact that he was also the nominee of another 
party.”
102
 
E. The Present Landscape of Fusion Laws in States Post-Timmons 
As a result of the Timmons decision, states are free to ban fusion 
voting without running afoul of First Amendment associational 
rights.  The vast majority of states take this approach by—either di-
rectly or indirectly—prohibiting the cross-nomination of candi-
dates.
103
  These laws, however, may contravene provisions in their state 
constitutions.
104
  State courts can be more critical of state justifications 
for burdening the associational rights of parties when analyzing viola-
tions pursuant to their own state constitutions than the Timmons 
Court was when it analyzed the violation of the New Party’s associa-
tional rights under the U.S. Constitution.  Additionally, state courts 
can explore the expressive rights of parties and voters at the ballot, 
which the Supreme Court has refused to recognize in the First 
Amendment.
105
 
Recently, fusion has garnered increased interest as state legisla-
tures have considered adopting fusion systems.
106
  Even though there 
 
 102 Id. at 370 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 103 See Fusion Candidacies, supra note 25, at 1303 n.14. 
 104 Many states have broad constitutional provisions, particularly in the area of 
free speech and assembly, which would protect minor parties from the infringement 
that anti-fusion laws place upon their associational and expressive rights.  See generally 
Berger, supra note 8 (arguing that anti-fusion laws are susceptible to state constitu-
tional challenges despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Timmons). 
 105 In Burdick and Timmons the United States Supreme Court held that the First 
Amendment does not protect the ballot as a forum for political expression.  Burdick 
v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 438, 441–42 (1992); Timmons, 520 U.S. at 363.  The Su-
preme Court, however, has since recognized a petition to secure placement of an in-
itiative or a referendum on the ballot as a forum for political expression.  See Doe v. 
Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2817–18 (2010).  Thus, Doe arguably “silently overrules” the 
Burdick and Timmons precedent that the ballot is not an expressive forum due First 
Amendment protection.  See Rick Hasen, Initial Thoughts on Doe v. Reed, ELECTION 
LAW BLOG (June 24, 2010, 11:22 AM), http://electionlawblog.org/ 
archives/016266.html.   
This Comment, however, assumes that Burdick and Timmons remain binding be-
cause the Court did not expressly overturn the precedent.  This Comment’s analysis 
remains the same in either situation though, as New Jersey is free to guarantee its 
own state’s constitutional rights regardless of how the Supreme Court interprets the 
corresponding rights in the U.S. Constitution.  See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 106 Oregon has repealed its anti-fusion ban, allowing the cross-nomination of can-
didates for the first time since the Progressive Era.  Jeff Mapes, Bill Loosens Parties’ 
Hold on Elections, THE OREGONIAN, July 6, 2009.  Connecticut greatly expanded its fu-
sion voting system in 2007.  See 2007 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 07-194 (Reg. Sess.).  Maine 
also held hearings in 2008 on a fusion voting bill before the legislature.  See LD 1799, 
123rd Me. Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2007). 
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is a minor revival of interest in fusion voting, the two major parties 
still use their strength to block legislative attempts to enact fusion, 
since the parties view fusion as a threat to their inherent power ad-
vantage under the current two-party system.
107
  As a result, there is a 
need for state constitutional challenges that aim to rescind the anti-
fusion laws and the burdens that they impose on minor parties and 
their members. 
III. NEW JERSEY MUST INDEPENDENTLY ANALYZE FUSION VOTING 
PURSUANT TO THE NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION 
A. The New Jersey State Constitution 
A state has the “sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution 
individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Fed-
eral Constitution.”
108
  State courts, through reliance on the state con-
stitution, have the ability to revive constitutional issues that the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court has settled.
109
  States have used state 
constitutional provisions to guarantee and protect a broader set of 
rights associated with elections, even in the face of the Supreme 
Court’s explicit rejection of the existence of a federally protected 
right.
110
 
 
 107 For example, Democratic Party officials largely resisted the fusion legislation in 
Oregon and considered pressuring the Governor to veto the measure.  See Mapes, 
supra note 106. 
 108 Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980). 
In our federal system, state constitutions have a significant role to play 
as protectors of individual rights and liberties. This role derives its cha-
racter from the freedom of state courts to move beyond the protections 
provided by federal doctrine and from the distinctive character of state 
courts and state constitutions. . . .  The present function of state consti-
tutions is as a second line of defense for those rights protected by the 
federal Constitution and as an independent source of supplemental 
rights unrecognized by federal law. 
Developments in the Law—Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 
1324, 1367 (1982). 
 109 William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 
90 HARV. L. REV 489, 502 (1977) (arguing that “the decisions of the Court are not, 
and should not be, dispositive of questions regarding rights guaranteed by counter-
part provisions of state law”). 
 110 Compare Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 189 (2008) (dec-
laring that Indiana’s requirement for voters to show photo identification did not vi-
olate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution), with League of 
Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Rokita, 915 N.E.2d 151 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (declaring 
that Indiana’s photo identification requirement for voters violated the state constitu-
tion’s Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause), superseded in part, 929 N.E.2d 758, 
760–61 (Ind. 2010) (finding the law facially constitutional, but leaving open the pos-
sibility of future as-applied challenges under the state constitution). 
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New Jersey courts have a history of looking to the state constitu-
tion instead of the Federal Constitution as an individual source of ro-
bust civil liberties and rights.
111
  New Jersey’s constitution is a “sepa-
rate fount of liberty” that the courts “must enforce.”
112
  The New 
Jersey Supreme Court has not hesitated to declare statutes unconsti-
tutional pursuant to the state constitution, regardless of the legisla-
tion’s validity pursuant to federal law.
113
 
New Jersey determines when to apply federal or state constitu-
tional provisions depending on the issue and the constitutional right 
before the court,
114
 as well as whether the United States Supreme 
Court has adequately addressed the issue at hand.
115
  When the federal 
courts fail to provide adequate protection of individual rights, then 
New Jersey’s courts will turn to the state constitution to ensure that 
an individual’s rights are fully guaranteed and protected.
116
  This 
Comment will demonstrate that the Supreme Court, in Timmons, did 
not adequately resolve the question of whether anti-fusion statutes in-
fringe on party and voter associational rights in light of New Jersey’s 
 
 111 See State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 963 (N.J. 1982) (Handler, J., concurring); see 
also Greenberg v. Kimmelman 494 A.2d 294, 302 (N.J. 1985); Comm. to Recall Ro-
bert Menendez from the Office of U.S. Senator v. Wells, 7 A.3d 720, 764 n.17 (N.J. 
2010) (Rivera-Soto, J., dissenting) (“[W]here the [New Jersey] Constitution provides 
protections more expansive than those embodied in the Federal Constitution, [the 
New Jersey Supreme Court is] not constrained by the limitations that the latter would 
impose.”). 
 112 Hunt, 450 A.2d at 960 (Pashman, J., concurring). 
 113 See, e.g., State v. Baker, 405 A.2d 368, 374–75 (N.J. 1979) (holding that a mu-
nicipal zoning ordinance prohibiting four or more unrelated individuals from living 
together was unconstitutional pursuant to the New Jersey Constitution despite the 
United States Supreme Court upholding such an ordinance under the federal consti-
tution); see also State v. Celmer, 404 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1979); Smith v. Penta, 405 A.2d 350, 
358 (N.J. 1979) (Pashman, J., dissenting). 
 114 See William F. Cook, The New Jersey Bill of Rights and a “Similarity Factors” Analysis, 
34 RUTGERS L.J. 1125, 1159 (2003). 
 115 See Horizon Health Ctr. v. Felicissimo, 638 A.2d 1260, 1272–73 (N.J. 1994). 
 116 Compare State v. Pierce, 642 A.2d 947 (N.J. 1994), with New York v. Belton, 453 
U.S. 454 (1981) (warrantless automobile searches); compare State v. Hempele, 576 
A.2d 793 (N.J. 1990), with California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (privacy in-
terest in curbside garbage); compare State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820 (N.J. 1987), 
with United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (good-faith exception to Fourth 
Amendment’s exclusionary rule); compare Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925 
(N.J. 1982), with Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (right to access medically ne-
cessary abortion for impoverished women); compare State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952 (N.J. 
1982), with Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (right to access defendant’s bill-
ing records); compare State v. Johnson, 346 A.2d 66 (N.J. 1975), with Schnekloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent to search); compare Robinson v. Cahill, 
303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973), with San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 
(1973) (constitutional right of public education). 
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broad protection of rights and given New Jersey’s unique political en-
vironment. 
B. The New Jersey Constitution’s Independent Source  
of Individual Rights 
New Jersey has seven divergent factors—the Hunt factors—to de-
termine whether to analyze an issue under the state constitution or to 
rely on the Federal Constitution.
117
  In State v. Hunt, Justice Handler 
in a concurring opinion outlined seven factors for New Jersey courts 
to consider when analyzing whether the New Jersey Constitution af-
fords greater liberties and rights than a similar or parallel federal 
constitutional provision.
118
  The factors “provide a basis for rejecting 
the constraints of federal doctrine at the state level.”
119
  The seven fac-
tors are: (1) textual language, (2) legislative history, (3) pre-existing 
state law, (4) structural differences, (5) matters of particular state in-
terest or local concern, (6) state traditions, and (7) public attitudes.
120
  
The New Jersey Supreme Court later adopted these factors for state 
courts to consider when determining whether to conduct an inde-
pendent state constitutional analysis.
121
  An analysis of the Hunt fac-
tors leads to the conclusion that the New Jersey Supreme Court must 
invoke the State constitution as an independent foundation for pro-
tecting and guaranteeing the rights of free association and expres-
sion, and not adhere to Timmons. 
 
 
 
 
 117 See, e.g., N.J. Coal. Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 
A.2d 757, 770, 777 (N.J. 1994) (relying on the Hunt factors to declare that the free 
speech provision in New Jersey’s Constitution protected an organization’s right to 
hand out leaflets at a mall even though the First Amendment did not protect this ex-
pressive activity); State v. Muhammad, 678 A.2d 164, 173–75 (N.J. 1996); State v. San-
chez, 609 A.2d 400, 407–08 (N.J. 1992); State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820, 850 (N.J. 
1987).  But see Justin Long, Intermittent State Constitutionalism, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 41, 81–
84 (2006) (discussing the New Jersey Supreme Court’s inconsistent application of the 
Hunt factors). 
 118 See State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 965–67 (N.J 1982) (Handler, J., concurring). 
 119 Id. at 965–66. 
 120 Id. at 965–67. 
 121 See State v. Williams, 459 A.2d 641, 650–51 (N.J. 1983).  
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1. Factors One, Two, Four and Six: Text, History, 
Structure, and Tradition 
The textual language,
122
 legislative history,
123
 structural differenc-
es
124
 and state traditions factors
125
 contain significant overlap.  Thus, 
this Comment will discuss these factors together. 
In State v. Schmid, the New Jersey Supreme Court analyzed the 
history, structure, and application of the State constitution’s free 
speech and assembly provisions in depth.
126
  The court determined 
that the free speech right in the New Jersey Constitution is an explicit 
affirmation of an individual’s rights that the government has an ex-
press duty to protect.
127
 
The affirmative grant of rights is structurally different than the 
Bill of Rights, which is expressly limited to prohibiting certain gov-
ernment actions.
128
  The legislative history of New Jersey’s constitu-
tional free speech provision demonstrates the framers’ intent to pro-
vide a more expansive protection of that right than the First 
Amendment.
129
  This history and tradition supports the robust protec-
 
 122 Textual language applies in one of two situations—when the State constitution 
guarantees a right not protected in the Federal Constitution and when the phrasing 
of the two clauses is significantly different.  Hunt, 450 A.2d at 965 (Handler, J., con-
curring). 
 123 “[L]egislative history may reveal an intention that will support reading the pro-
vision independently of federal law.”  Id.  
 124  
The United States Constitution is a grant of enumerated powers to the 
federal government.  Our State Constitution, on the other hand, serves 
only to limit the sovereign power which inheres directly in the people 
and indirectly in their elected representatives.  Hence, the explicit af-
firmation of fundamental rights in our Constitution can be seen as a 
guarantee of those rights and not as a restriction upon them. 
Id. at 966 (internal citations omitted). 
 125 “A state’s history and traditions may also provide a basis for the independent 
application of its constitution.”  Id. at 966. 
 126 State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 624–28 (N.J. 1980).  
 127 Id at 627–28. 
 128 Id. at 627 (“[T]he explicit affirmation of these fundamental rights in our Con-
stitution can be seen as a guarantee of those rights and not as a restriction upon 
them.”).  The First Amendment is a restriction on the federal government, as well as 
on state governments, through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. 
 129 State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 965 (N.J. 1982) (Handler, J., concurring) (citing 
Schmid, 423 A.2d at 626–27; Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly, 445 A.2d 376, 392–93 
(N.J. 1982) (Schreiber, J., dissenting)).  But see John B. Wefing, The Performance of the 
New Jersey Supreme Court at the Opening of the Twenty-First Century: New Cast, Same Script, 
32 SETON HALL L. REV. 769, 811 n.218 (2003) (observing that Schmid stated that New 
Jersey adopted its own free speech provision from the New York Constitution, whose 
provision was adopted from the Connecticut Constitution, yet both New York and 
Connecticut reached a different result in analyzing free speech in connection with 
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tion of an individual’s expressive rights.
130
  Therefore, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court must analyze the anti-fusion law under the broader 
and more robust free speech provision of the New Jersey Constitution 
in order to fully protect the parties’ and voters’ freedoms of associa-
tion and expression. 
2. Factor Three: Pre-Existing State Law 
The New Jersey Supreme Court has protected free speech and 
press rights, under paragraph 6 of the New Jersey Constitution, more 
expansively than a First Amendment analysis would guarantee.
131
  
Since Schmid, New Jersey courts have demonstrated a willingness to 
guarantee broad rights of speech and assembly, pursuant to Article I, 
paragraphs 6 and 18 of the state constitution.
132
  The New Jersey Su-
preme has further enhanced and defined the doctrine of strong pro-
tection for “the right of every person and of every group to make 
their views known, however popular or unpopular they may be, and 
the right of the public to hear them and learn from them.”
133
 
Schmid and its progeny concern political speech on private prop-
erty.  In Schmid, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that an individu-
al, who distributed political materials at a private university but was 
not a student, could not be convicted of trespassing upon private 
property.
134
  The court held that private property rights can be rea-
 
distributing pamphlets in a mall in cases similar to New Jersey Coalition Against War 
(citing Shad Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 488 N.E.2d 1211 (N.Y. 1985); Cologne v. 
Westfarms Assocs., 469 A.2d 1201 (Conn. 1984))). 
 130 See Schmid, 423 A.2d at 626–27 (emphasizing New Jersey’s strong tradition of 
guaranteeing individual expressional and associational rights in holding that the 
New Jersey Constitution provided greater protections for the right to free speech 
than those found in the Federal Constitution).  In Green Party, the New Jersey Su-
preme Court noted that, historically, New Jersey found itself in the middle of legal 
debates analyzing the freedom of speech and assembly.  See Green Party v. Hartz Mt. 
Indus., 752 A.2d 315, 321 (N.J. 2000). 
 131 See, e.g., Green Party, 752 A.2d 315; Rocci v. Ecole Secondaire Mac-Donald-
Cartier, 755 A.2d 583, 586 (N.J. 2000); New Jersey Coal. Against War in the Middle 
East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757 (N.J. 1994); Sisler v. Gannett Co., 516 A.2d 
1083, 1092–93 (N.J. 1986); Schmid, 423 A.2d 615. 
 132 See Schmid, 423 A.2d at 626 (referring to provisions in paragraphs 6 and 18 as 
“more sweeping in scope than the First Amendment”); New Jersey Coal. Against War, 
650 A.2d at 770 (“Precedent, text, structure, and history all compel the conclusion 
that the New Jersey Constitution’s right of free speech is broader than the right 
against governmental abridgement of speech found in the First Amendment.”); Green 
Party, 752 A.2d at 325 (“[T]he New Jersey’s Constitution’s free speech provision is an 
affirmative right, broader than practically all others in the nation . . . .”). 
 133 New Jersey Coal. Against War, 650 A.2d at 780. 
 134 Schmid, 423 A.2d at 616, 633. 
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sonably restricted to protect the rights of free speech and assembly 
guaranteed in the state constitution.
135
 
Nevertheless, ignoring the political expression at the core of 
these cases and solely viewing the broad freedom of speech protec-
tion as strictly limited to the private property setting is improper.  It 
would be inconsistent for the New Jersey Constitution to broadly pro-
tect expressive acts against oppressive and unreasonably restrictive 
private conduct but then simultaneously allow the government to re-
strict expression by engaging in the same conduct as the private ac-
tors.
136
 
At times, however, New Jersey courts have indicated that the free 
speech analysis under the New Jersey Constitution is co-extensive with 
an analysis under the First Amendment.
137
  But in free speech cases 
where the New Jersey Supreme Court chose to apply the Federal 
Constitution instead of the state constitution, the speech at hand was 
commercial speech rather than political expression.
138
 
Political speech warrants more constitutional protection than 
commercial speech because free and open political expression is at 
 
 135 Id. at 630. 
 136 Schmid, in emphasizing the “affirmative grants of rights” protected in Article I, 
paragraphs 6 and 18 of the New Jersey Constitution, “makes it clear that New Jersey’s 
more expansive protection for freedom of expression is not limited to its applicabili-
ty to private infringements.”  Frank Askin, Free-er Speech in New Jersey, 161 N.J. LAW. 12, 
13 (1994); see also Cook, supra note 114, at 1144 n.146 (arguing that it is inappro-
priate to narrowly view Schmid as just discussing property rights rather than political 
speech). 
 137 See Hamilton Amusement Ctr. v. Verniero, 716 A.2d 1137, 1141–42 (N.J. 1998); 
see also Twp. of Pennsauken v. Schad, 733 A.2d 1159, 1169 (N.J. 1999); Bell v. Twp. of 
Stafford, 541 A.2d 692, 697 (N.J. 1988). 
 138 For example, Hamilton concerned the State’s regulation of signs used in sexual-
ly oriented businesses.  Hamilton, 716 A.2d at 1140.  Another case where the New Jer-
sey Supreme Court relied on federal analysis, as opposed to conducting an indepen-
dent state constitution free speech analysis, involved not protecting a fireman’s 
drunken racial slur as free speech.  See Karins v. City of Atlantic City, 706 A.2d 706, 
716 (N.J. 1998).  Neither these commercial speech examples, nor a racial slur, can be 
equated with the important nature of political expression and association.  For a dis-
cussion arguing how the Court’s reliance on precedent in Hamilton Amusement to de-
termine that the New Jersey Constitution and First Amendment free speech provi-
sions are analyzed co-extensively is faulty and “lack[s] a sturdy analysis of state 
constitutional law,” see Cook, supra note 114, at 1146–47 (arguing that the cases that  
Hamilton relied upon to establish the premise of co-existing free speech provisions 
either discussed other provisions in the State Constitution and Federal Constitution 
(Shelton College v. State Bd. of Educ., 226 A.2d 612 (N.J. 1967)) or failed to even 
mention Article I, paragraph 6 (Bell v. Twp. of Stafford, 541 A.2d 692 (N.J. 1988))). 
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the core of a democracy.
139
  The New Jersey Supreme Court has fre-
quently distinguished the importance of political speech over com-
mercial speech, declaring that political expression “occupies a pre-
ferred position” among other constitutionally protected rights.
140
  
When political speech is involved, New Jersey tradition insists that the 
government “‘allow the widest room for discussion, the narrowest 
range for its restriction.’”
141
 Therefore, an analysis of the anti-fusion 
law, which inhibits a party’s core political activity—association and 
expression—must follow the jurisprudence of prior political speech 
cases in New Jersey, which have applied the broad, free-speech pro-
tections of the New Jersey Constitution, as opposed to commercial 
speech cases, which have not. 
3. Factor Five: Matters of Particular State Interest  
or Local Concern 
The Supreme Court’s analysis in Timmons is not sufficient be-
cause it fails to consider New Jersey’s unique and individual jurispru-
dence and political structure.
142
  Justice Handler recognized that 
some issues are either “uniquely appropriate for independent state 
action,”
143
 or so “local in character, and do not appear to require a 
uniform national policy, [that] they are ripe for decision under state 
law.”
144
  New Jersey has its own political culture and environment that 
gives rise to distinctive characteristics in the political and electoral 
process. 
The United States Supreme Court found that a fusion ban was 
only a minor burden on a party’s associational rights.
145
  Thus, the 
Court did not require that a regulation banning fusion be narrowly 
 
 139 See New Jersey Coal. Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 
A.2d 757, 781–82 (N.J. 1994); Barry v. Arrow Pontiac, Inc., 494 A.2d 804, 812 (N.J. 
1985). 
 140 See State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 627 (N.J. 1980) (quoting State v. Miller, 416 
A.2d 821, 826 (N.J. 1980)). 
 141 Id. (quoting Miller, 416 A.2d at 826). 
 142 The United States Supreme Court, by its nature, must develop laws of general 
applicability that each state is required to follow.  The Supreme Court has to focus 
on a national perspective, while the New Jersey Supreme Court must tailor its analysis 
to the local state issue.  See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 143 State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 966 (N.J. 1982) (Handler, J., concurring) (citing 
State v. Alston, 440 A.2d 1311, 1319 (N.J. 1981)). 
 144 Id. (Handler, J., concurring) (citing Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 
833 (1976); Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 
299 (1851)). 
 145 Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 362–64 (1997); see also 
supra text accompanying note 96. 
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tailored to achieve a valid state interest.
146
  New Jersey, however, 
would not characterize this infringement as a minor burden,
147
 given 
the state’s “strong tradition of protecting individual expressional and 
associational rights.”
148
  The fact that a political organization is the 
victim of discrimination contributes to the severity of the burden.
149
 
New Jersey law guarantees that the election system will robustly 
protect individuals and parties.  New Jersey election statutes must “‘al-
low the greatest scope for public participation in the electoral 
process, to allow candidates to get on the ballot, to allow parties to 
put their candidates on the ballot, and most importantly to allow the 
voters a choice on Election Day.’”
150
 
The pre-existing rights of third parties in New Jersey and the 
state’s political system make the issue a matter of local concern.  For 
example, New Jersey has a generous ballot access law, which requires 
a low number of signatures for any candidate to obtain access to the 
ballot,
151
 and that requirement is even lower for a minor party peti-
tion candidate.
152
  The candidate in Timmons was required to obtain 
five-times as many signatures pursuant to Minnesota’s election laws in 
 
 146 Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358–60; see also supra text accompanying notes 97–98. 
 147 State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 628 (N.J. 1980) (“The State Constitution . . . 
serves to thwart inhibitory actions which unreasonably frustrate, infringe, or obstruct 
the expressional and associational rights of individuals exercised under Article I, pa-
ragraphs 6 and 18 thereof.”); State v. Klapprott, 22 A.2d 877, 880 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1941) 
(A legislative act cannot limit or restrict the constitutional “guarantees of freedom of 
assemblage and speech and freedom to communicate information and opinions to 
others.”). 
 148 See Hunt, 450 A.2d at 966 (Handler, J., concurring); see discussion supra Part 
III.B.1–2. 
 149 See Council of Alt. Political Parties v. State, 781 A.2d 1041, 1046 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2001) (citing Council of Alt. Political Parties v. State, No. MER-C-6-99 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Apr. 25, 2000) (Parrillo, J.)). 
 150 N.J. Democratic Party v. Samson, 814 A.2d 1028, 1036 (N.J. 2002) (quoting Ca-
tania v. Haberle, 588 A.2d 374, 379 (N.J. 1991)). 
 151 See Council of Alt. Political Parties, 781 A.2d at 1053 (referring to New Jersey’s 
“liberal ballot access laws”).  The ballot access requirement for a petition nomination 
has remained unchanged since the late-nineteenth century despite the significant 
increase in New Jersey’s population.  In 1898, the number of signatures required to 
secure a nomination by petition was 800 for a statewide office and no more than 100 
signatures for an office that did not represent the state at-large.  1898 N.J. Sess. Law, 
c. 139, sec. 41, at p. 257.  
 152 Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:13-5 (West 2010) (requiring a candidate for a 
statewide office seeking access on the ballot through petition to secure 800 signa-
tures), with id. § 19:23-8 (requiring a candidate for a statewide office of a major party 
conducting a primary election to secure 1,000 signatures). 
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order to reach the ballot through petition.
153
  New Jersey further aids 
minor parties by allowing them to access the ballot solely through se-
curing the requisite number of signatures for a petition, whereas the 
major parties must conduct a primary first.
154
  These two advantages 
for minor parties may seem insignificant, but they are indicative of 
the fact that the State is already providing additional rights to minor 
parties.  Therefore, a fusion law that benefits minor parties would not 
contravene the previously expressed policies of New Jersey. 
4. Additional Factor: Little or No Chance of a  
Legislative Remedy 
Given the strength of the two major parties and the established 
interests that they may have in not granting any further rights or 
access to the minor parties, there is little chance of the New Jersey 
Legislature remedying the situation on its own.
155
  Judicial action is 
needed when there is little or no chance of a legislative remedy.  Fur-
thermore, New Jersey courts have recently moved in the direction of 
granting more rights to third parties and partially reducing the sub-
stantial advantage that the two major parties have over minor par-
ties.
156
 
The strong presumption resulting from the Hunt factors analysis 
is that, in the absence of federal protection, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court must rely on an independent state constitutional analysis to 
 
 153 Compare MINN. STAT. § 204B.07 (1994) (requiring petition candidates for state 
legislative offices to collect the lesser of 500 signatures or of 10% of the individuals 
living within the district), with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:13-5 (requiring no more than 100 
signatures for petitions for any office that is not statewide). 
 154 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:13-5; see also Council of Alt. Political Parties v. Hooks, 
179 F.3d 64, 79 (3d Cir. 1999) (opining that New Jersey’s two separate methods of 
granting ballot access “places a heavier burden on the [major] party candidates”). 
 155 See Council of Alt. Political Parties, 781 A.2d at 1046 (citing Council of Alt. Politi-
cal Parties v. State, No. MER-C-6-99 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Apr. 25, 2000) (Parrillo, 
J.)).  But see Smith v. Penta, 405 A.2d 350, 357 (N.J. 1979) (Change to the two-party 
system “must come from the legislature or from the people. It cannot come from the 
courts.”). 
Only one legislature (Connecticut), in at least seventy years, expanded its state’s 
fusion system and only one legislature (Oregon), over the past eighty years, repealed 
its state’s fusion ban.  Dan Cantor, Reviving a Lost Tool of Democracy: Prospects for Ex-
panded Fusion Voting, TPMCAFE, (July 11, 2007, 9:52 AM), 
http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/2007/07/11/reviving_a_lost_tool_of_dem
ocr; Richard Winger, Oregon Legalizes Fusion, BALLOT ACCESS NEWS (Aug. 1, 2009), 
http://www.ballot-access.org/2009/080109.html#2.   
 156 See, e.g., Council of Alt. Political Parties, 781 A.2d. at 1043, 1051 (ordering that 
the State allow voters to register as members of certain minor parties and declaring 
unconstitutional the State’s practice of distributing voter information for free to the 
major parties and at a charge to the minor parties). 
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guarantee the broad associational and expressive rights of parties and 
voters upon which the anti-fusion law infringes. 
IV. NEW JERSEY STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
New Jersey’s anti-fusion law unconstitutionally burdens the as-
sociational rights of minor parties and candidates by regulating the 
internal decision-making process of a party and preventing the party 
from nominating its desired standard bearer.  The fusion ban also vi-
olates the expressive rights of voters and minor parties by limiting a 
voter’s right to engage in political speech through the ballot and by 
infringing upon a minor party’s right to convey its political message 
to the public through a candidate who best represents the party’s 
principles.  The anti-fusion law, however, does not unconstitutionally 
violate the right to vote because the burden on voter choice is not se-
vere. 
A. New Jersey’s Balancing Approach to State Constitutional Rights 
When adjudicating claims of infringement upon state-protected 
constitutional rights, New Jersey does not tend to use strict classifica-
tions (as federal courts do
157
) for the competing State interests and 
alleged constitutional violations.
158
  Rejecting the federal approach 
when applying state constitutional provisions, the New Jersey Su-
preme Court has pronounced that “[r]ather than to slot cases into 
tiers of strict scrutiny or narrow tailoring, we have attempted in con-
stitutional analysis to balance the competing interests, giving proper 
weight to the constitutional values.”
159
 
 
 157 See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997); Burdick 
v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).  The 
test that the United States Supreme Court used in Timmons clearly involves multiple 
classifications—one for the burden on the right and one for the state’s justification.  
In Timmons, the Court determined that the infringement on the New Party’s freedom 
of association right was “not severe,” thus, Minnesota’s prohibition on fusion did not 
need to be narrowly tailored in order to achieve the State’s legitimate interests.  
Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358. 
 158 See Green Party v. Hartz Mt. Indus., 752 A.2d 315, 327 (N.J. 2000).  Adhering to 
strict classifications creates “‘a veil of tiers which shrouds [the] essential issue.’”  Id. 
(quoting Matthews v. Atlantic City, 417 A.2d 1011, 1023 (1980) (Clifford, J., dissent-
ing)). 
 159 Id. at 327.  In Green Party, a political organization wished to collect signatures 
for a candidate’s nomination petition at a private mall.  The New Jersey Supreme 
Court had to balance a political organization’s rights to free speech and assembly 
against the private property rights of a mall.  Id. at 327–28. 
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The New Jersey Supreme Court uses a balancing test that weighs 
competing interests and rights to determine the constitutionality
160
 of 
a statute pursuant to the New Jersey Constitution.
161
  The balancing 
approach operates as a sliding scale which “giv[es] proper weight to 
the constitutional values [involved]. . . .  The more important the 
constitutional right sought to be exercised, the greater the . . . need 
must be to justify interference with the exercise of that right.”
162
  New 
Jersey courts have specifically used a balancing test in recent years to 
determine the constitutionality of election statutes.
163
  When analyz-
ing whether the anti-fusion laws infringe on a party’s or individual’s 
rights of expression and association, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
will give the utmost weight to the rights to vote
164
 and to freely express 
oneself politically
165
 against any competing State interests that in-
fringe upon them because these rights are at the center of a free and 
democratic political system. 
 
 160 New Jersey statutes are presumed to be constitutional when challenged.  Lewis 
v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 221 (N.J. 2006). 
 161 See, e.g., Comm. for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners Assoc., 
929 A.2d 1060 (N.J. 2007) (balancing an individual’s expressional rights against 
homeowner association’s property rights); New Jersey Coal. Against War in the Mid-
dle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757 (N.J. 1994) (balancing right to political 
speech against rights of property owner); Murray v. Lawson, 649 A.2d 1253 (N.J. 
1994) (balancing right of protestors and property rights of privacy in residence); In 
re Randolph, 502 A.2d 503 (N.J. 1986) (balancing employee’s free speech and associ-
ation rights against a nonpartisan judiciary); State v. Williams, 459 A.2d 641 (N.J. 
1983) (balancing the rights of the press and the public to access pretrial proceedings 
and a defendant’s right to a fair and impartial jury). 
 162 Green Party, 752 A.2d at 327 (N.J. 2000) (citing Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 494 
A.2d 294, 302 (N.J. 1985); State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 374 (N.J. 1971)).  
 163 See, e.g., In re Attorney Gen.’s “Directive on Exit Polling: Media and Non-
Partisan Public Interest Groups,” 981 A.2d 64, 76–80 (N.J. 2009) (determining that 
protecting the right to vote unobstructed outweighed non-profit organizations’ right 
of free speech to distribute voting-rights pamphlets as well as the free press and 
speech rights of media organization to conduct exit polling outside a polling place 
on election day); Council of Alt. Political Parties v. State, 781 A.2d 1041 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2001) (determining that the burdens on New Jersey’s minor parties’ 
freedom of speech and association and equal protection rights outweighed the 
State’s competing interest in justifying those burdens). 
 164 See Gangemi v. Rosengard, 207A.2d 665, 667 (N.J. 1965) (noting that the right 
to vote “is the keystone of a truly democratic society.”). 
 165 See State v. Miller, 416 A.2d 821, 826 (N.J. 1980) (observing that “political 
speech . . . occupies a preferred position in our system of constitutionally-protected 
interests”); Hudson Cnty. News Co. v. Sills, 195 A.2d 626, 633 (N.J. 1963) (“The great 
freedoms of expression are invaluable rights guaranteed by both our State and Fed-
eral Constitutions and they must be vigilantly guarded.”). 
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B. Constitutional Burdens 
The New Jersey Constitution affirmatively grants the right of free 
speech to its citizens.
166
  Each citizen has the right to assemble and pe-
tition the government.
167
  New Jersey has recognized the right of asso-
ciation in numerous cases dealing with political parties and their 
members.
168
  The right to vote is a fundamental right in the New Jer-
sey Constitution
169
 and it contains a derivative right of voter choice, 
but not a corresponding right to run for office.
170
 
1. Free Association 
The freedom of association protects parties, candidates, and in-
dividual voters.  Associational rights guarantee “not only that an indi-
vidual voter has the right to associate with the political party of her 
choice, but also that a political party has a right to identify people 
who constitute the association, and to select a standard bearer who 
 
 166 N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 6. 
 167 N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 18. 
 168 E.g., Smith v. Penta, 405 A.2d 350, 356–57 (N.J. 1979) (holding that the associ-
ational rights of parties is an important interest that the closed primary system pro-
tects); Lesniak v. Budzash, 626 A.2d 1073, 1081 (N.J. 1993) (discussing a voter’s right 
to associate with the party of his choice and a party’s right of association in the can-
didate nomination process). 
 169 N.J. CONST. art. II, sec. I, para. 3; see also In re Attorney Gen.’s “Directive on Exit 
Polling: Media and Non-Partisan Public Interest Groups,” 981 A.2d 64, 75 (N.J. 2009) 
(noting that the New Jersey State Constitution designates one entire article to “enu-
merating the rights and duties associated with elections and suffrage” (citing N.J. 
CONST. art. II)). 
 170 The right to vote in New Jersey does not contain a fundamental right to be a 
candidate.  See Batko v. Sayreville Democratic Org., 860 A.2d 967, 971 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2004) (citing McCann v. Clerk of City of Jersey City, 771 A.2d 1123, 1131 
(2001)); see also Matthews v. Atlantic City, 417 A.2d 1011, 1016 (N.J. 1980) (“With re-
gard to the individual interests involved, we recognize that the right to be a candi-
date for office has never been held by either the United States Supreme Court or this 
Court to enjoy ‘fundamental’ status.” (citing Wurtzel v. Falcey, 354 A.2d 617 (N.J. 
1976))); Stothers v. Martini, 79 A.2d 857, 859 (N.J. 1951).  New Jersey has recognized 
that “[t]he right to run for and hold public office is a valuable one . . . .”  Cottingham 
v. Voight, 160 A.2d 57, 60 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960) (emphasis added); see also 
Stothers, 79 A.2d at 859 (N.J. 1951) (quoting In re Ray, 56 A.2d 761, 763, 765 (Glouce-
ster County Cir. Ct. 1947)).   
A statute restraining the eligibility to run for office is a restriction on the right to 
vote, but it is not an unconstitutional violation of the right to vote.  See Gangemi v. 
Rosengard, 207A.2d 665, 667 (N.J. 1965).  For example, New Jersey has upheld a 
prohibition of a candidate’s ability to run as a third party or independent candidate 
subsequent to losing a primary nomination.  Sadloch v. Allan, 135 A.2d 173, 178–79 
(N.J. 1957).  Since there is no fundamental right to run for office or be a candidate, 
an individual does not have a right to run as a specific party’s candidate for office. 
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best represents the party’s ideologies and preferences.”
171
  Freedom of 
association protects parties in order to guarantee that individuals can 
gather together for a common purpose and coordinate to achieve 
expressive goals.
172
  Anti-fusion laws can significantly inhibit this core 
function.
173
 
a. A Minor Party’s Right of Free Association 
New Jersey’s anti-fusion law is an unconstitutional violation of a 
minor party’s right of free association.  Political parties have associa-
tional rights in selecting a nominee that the State must protect be-
cause the process “affords an opportunity to adherents of some polit-
ical philosophy to advance their goals, proselytize their beliefs and 
seek to acquire or perpetuate their power.”
174
  The fusion ban limits 
the core associational function of parties—choosing a standard bear-
er—and infringes on a party’s internal nomination process. 
The fusion ban burdens a party’s associational rights because the 
party is unable to select its desired standard bearer to represent it on 
the ballot in the general election.  The right to select a candidate to 
carry the party’s platform and deliver arguments to the public is the 
core associational right of any political party.  New Jersey has a history 
of supporting the notion that parties can select as a nominee the per-
son who best represents their philosophies.
175
 
Nominating a candidate is a mechanism by which the party can 
introduce itself to the public, share its views, and attract like-minded 
voters and supporters.
176
  To win a nomination, a party and its mem-
 
 171 Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 224 (1989) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 172 See Berger, supra note 8, at 1394.  
 173 See id.  New Jersey’s fusion ban does not unconstitutionally infringe upon a 
voter’s right of association.  An individual voter undoubtedly has the right to asso-
ciate with the party of his choice.  See Lesniak v. Budzash, 626 A.2d 1073, 1081 (N.J. 
1993).  The anti-fusion statute, however, does not limit or impede an individual from 
associating with a minor party.  See Brief for Petitioners at *10, 31, Timmons v. Twin 
Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997) (No. 95-1608), 1996 WL 435927.  The fu-
sion ban does not stop an individual from voting for a minor party at the polling 
place.  The voter can still associate with a minor party’s desired candidate on another 
party line and the infringement is more on the candidate and the minor party who 
are blocked from associating with each other.  No State law or constitutional belief 
supports the notion that an individual voter has the right to associate with a candi-
date under a specific party banner. 
 174 See Smith v. Penta, 405 A.2d 350, 356 (N.J. 1979). 
 175 See Stevenson v. Gilfert, 100 A.2d 490, 494–95 (N.J. 1953). 
 176 See Brief for Republican National Committee as Amicus Curiae supporting 
Respondent at *7–8, Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997) 
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bers must accept some, or most, of the candidate’s views.  Since a 
candidate represents the party and a candidate conveys his beliefs to 
the public, infringing on a party’s selection of a candidate necessarily 
inhibits the party’s ability to speak to the public and attempt to broa-
den its base of support.
177
  Building party support by nominating can-
didates who are not the first choice is extremely difficult.  A voter will 
vote for the stronger candidate, even if that voter is a member of the 
minor party. 
Furthermore, the State’s regulation of internal party affairs, spe-
cifically with the nomination process, infringes upon a party’s associa-
tional rights.  The New Jersey Legislature grants parties the right to 
nominate a candidate to represent the party on the ballot.
178
  Once 
the Legislature has given that right to a party, it cannot limit or in-
fringe upon it by preventing the party from nominating a candidate 
that is qualified to hold the office.
179
  The Legislature cannot prohibit 
one party from nominating a candidate just because he is a member 
of another party since “it certainly would be a step backward to say 
that a political party shall not select a good man for its candidate, 
perhaps a better man than they have in their own ranks, because he 
does not wear its style of political garment.”
180
  The fusion ban runs 
counter to this premise—it prevents a minor party from endorsing a 
candidate who is qualified to run for office—resulting in a direct 
burden on the party’s internal governance and decision to associate 
with that candidate. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court declared that parties must be 
able to freely decide who their nominee will be in an election on the 
basis of what the members want, not on the basis of what non-
members decide in another nomination process.
181
  This is why New 
 
(No. 95-1608), 1996 WL 470949 [hereinafter Brief for Republican National Commit-
tee]. 
 177 See id. at *11–12. 
 178 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:5-1 (West 2010) (major parties can nominate through 
primaries); id. § 19:13-1 (minor party and independent candidates can be nominated 
through petition). 
 179 See Gansz v. Johnson, 75 A.2d 831, 832 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1950). 
 180 See In re City Clerk of Paterson, 88 A. 694, 696 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1913). 
 181 See Lesniak v. Budzash, 626 A.2d 1073, 1081 (N.J. 1993) (noting that primary 
elections must “‘reflect the will of party members, undistorted by the votes of those 
unconcerned with, if not actually hostile to, the principles, philosophies, and goals of 
the party’” (quoting Smith v. Penta, 405 A.2d 350, 353 (N.J. 1979))); see also Steven-
son v. Gilfert, 100 A.2d 490, 492 (N.J. 1953) (Primary participation is partly justified 
“‘to repel interference from outsiders who are not bound by the common tie and do 
not share the common aim.’” (quoting Wene v. Meyner, 98 A.2d 573, 576 (N.J. 
1953))). 
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Jersey allows parties to hold closed primaries.
182
  The State lets a party 
associate with only its members when selecting the party’s candidate.  
In New Jersey, the tradition of holding closed primaries to prevent 
party raiding is long justified on the basis of a “keep out the enemies 
and adverse interests” mentality.  The State has shown that it wants to 
protect a party’s interests from those who wish to disrupt it by allow-
ing association only with those voters who share the same goals and 
ideas.  New Jersey has also upheld a law requiring that any substitute 
candidate be a member of the same political party in order to protect 
the associational right of the party to have its desired candidate.
183
 
The anti-fusion law declares that once a candidate accepts a 
nomination for a major party, a minor party is forbidden from choos-
ing that same candidate as its own nominee.
184
  The ban essentially 
gives one party the power to prevent another party from nominating 
a candidate, thus violating the established New Jersey principle that 
party members should be able to decide their nominee without the 
interference of non-party members.  Furthermore, a third party 
would not nominate a major party candidate unless he shared the 
same goals as the party; fusion tickets would not fall within the “ene-
my” or “adverse interest” category from which the New Jersey Su-
preme Court has protected parties.  Cross-nomination should fall 
within the hands-off approach that the State has taken in allowing 
parties to freely exercise their associational rights in selecting a can-
didate. 
The State will argue that the cross-nomination ban does not af-
fect or limit the “internal structure, governance, and policy-making” 
that are at the center of a party’s associational rights.
185
  The State will 
defend the constitutionality of the anti-fusion law, declaring that it 
does not violate a minor party’s associational rights because that mi-
nor party has the power to nominate anyone who it can convince to 
be its candidate.
186
  A party is still free to, and has the right to, per-
suade the candidate to accept the minor party’s nomination instead 
of the major party’s nomination.
187
 
The political reality in New Jersey makes this an impractical ex-
pectation.  No major party nominee would forgo the Republican or 
 
 182 See Smith, 405 A.2d at 353, 356. 
 183 See Stevenson, 100 A.2d at 495. 
 184 See discussion supra notes 72–80 and accompanying text. 
 185 See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 363 (1997). 
 186 See id. at 360 (quoting Swamp v. Kennedy, 950 F.2d 383, 385 (7th Cir. 1991)).  
 187 See id. 
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Democratic nomination to be a minor party candidate.
188
  More im-
portantly, this expectation is impossible, because pursuant to New 
Jersey’s election law, once a candidate becomes a major party’s no-
minee, he is not allowed to renounce that nomination in favor of a 
minor party’s petition.
189
 
b. A Candidate’s Right of Free Association 
The fusion ban burdens the associational rights of a minor par-
ty’s desired fusion candidate.  The prohibition inhibits a candidate 
who has a major party nomination for an office from associating with 
any other party aside from that major party.  This is an unconditional 
restriction on a candidate’s associational rights because the State is 
dictating with whom he can or cannot associate. 
New Jersey has previously declared that a statute requiring a 
candidate to certify that he is a member of that party before he could 
run in the primary was invalid as an arbitrary limitation of candidacy 
for an elected office.
190
  The court wondered, “What exclusion could 
be more arbitrary than that one party organization should not be 
permitted to nominate a candidate who belonged to another par-
ty?”
191
 
Through the anti-fusion statute, the Legislature is essentially stat-
ing that a candidate is unable to accept a minor party nomination 
solely because he is the candidate of another party.  This rationale is 
the same type of arbitrary restriction upon a requirement for candi-
dacy that New Jersey has previously deemed invalid.
192
 
The State will argue that, since the statute does not keep any 
candidates off the ballot, it does not violate any of the candidates’ as-
sociational rights.
193
  The objection to the ban, however, is not that it 
keeps a candidate off the ballot but that it keeps the party’s desired 
 
 188 See N.J. Democratic Party v. Samson, 814 A.2d 1028, 1041 (N.J. 2002) (“Al-
though the participation of third-party candidates supports a robust democracy, we 
recognize the present reality of the two-party system as an organizing principle of the 
political process in this country.”); Friends of Governor Tom Kean v. N.J. Election 
Law Enforcement Comm’n, 552 A.2d 612, 613 (N.J. 1989) (noting that elections and 
campaigns in New Jersey “take place . . . in the context of a partisan, party-based po-
litical system”).  
 189 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:13-4 (West 2010) (“No such petition shall undertake to 
nominate any candidate who has accepted the nomination for the primary for such 
position.”); Sadloch v. Allan, 135 A.2d 173, 176, 178–79 (N.J. 1957). 
 190 Gansz v. Johnson, 75 A.2d 831, 832–33 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1950). 
 191 Id. at 832. 
 192 See id. 
 193 See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 173, at *19–20. 
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candidate from appearing on the ballot with that minor party’s de-
signation and seal of approval.  This distinction is where the burden 
on a candidate’s associational rights arises. 
2. Free Expression 
New Jersey is not bound by the same First Amendment limits as 
the federal courts are in interpreting expressive acts.
194
  Where politi-
cal speech is involved, New Jersey’s tradition insists that government 
“‘allow the widest room for discussion, the narrowest range for its re-
striction.’”
195
  Even though First Amendment jurisprudence does not 
mandate the protection of expression at the ballot,
196
 New Jersey does 
not explicitly bar or restrict a voter’s or party’s expression at or 
through the ballot.
197
  Rather, the State recognizes that the ballot, at 
least in part, is a means of expressive activity.
198
  For example, New 
Jersey identifies an affirmative right of expression at the ballot 
through a write-in vote.
199
 
 
 194 See Berger, supra note 8, at 1415 (“State constitutions value voting more than 
the federal Constitution. Moreover, they offer more protection for expressive activi-
ties.  Therefore, state courts should understand voting as an act of expression.”).  In 
Timmons, the New Party focused solely on associational rights given the Supreme 
Court’s precedent in the area of associational rights, but not in voting as expression, 
thus forgoing an individual’s expressive rights argument.  Id. at 1395.  The New Party 
argued that the ballot served an expressive function for parties; however, it did not 
argue an infringement on freedom of expression for an individual voter.  Id. & 1395 
n.101. 
 195 See State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 627 (N.J. 1980) (quoting State v. Miller, 416 
A.2d 821, 826 (N.J. 1980)); 
see also discussion supra Part III.B.1–2. 
 196 See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 438, 441 (1992); Timmons v. Twin Cities 
Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 363 (1997).  For a discussion that the Court, in Doe v. 
Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010), overruled Burdick and Timmons on this issue see supra 
note 105. 
 197 See Sadloch v. Allan, 135 A.2d 173, 179 (N.J. 1957) (recognizing a right of vot-
ers to express a vote for a write-in candidate) (citing N.J. CONST. art. II, para. 3); Ste-
venson v. Gilfert, 100 A.2d 490 (N.J. 1953); see also In re Gray-Sadler, 753 A.2d 1101, 
1105 (N.J. 2000).  The Legislature’s silence on this issue must be contrasted to the 
explicit bar on expressive activity in the 100-foot areas outside of any polling place.  
See N.J. STAT ANN. § 19:34-6 (West 2010); id. § 19:34-7; id. § 19:34-15; see also In re At-
torney Gen.’s “Directive on Exit Polling: Media and Non-Partisan Public Interest 
Groups,” 981 A.2d 64, 71–75 (N.J. 2009). 
 198 Cf. Sadloch, 135 A.2d at 179 (citing N.J. CONST. art. II, para. 3); see also Comm. 
to Recall Robert Menendez from the Office of U.S. Senator v. Wells, 7 A.3d 720, 752 
(N.J. 2010) (Rivera-Soto, J., dissenting) (“It is through the exercise of their right to 
vote that the people . . . can make themselves heard.”). 
 199 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:49-5 (West 2010); see also In re Ocean Cnty. Comm’r, 
879 A.2d 1174, 1181 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005). 
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Fusion voting is an expressive act in two ways.
200
  First, voting, at 
its core, represents an opportunity for individual voters to express 
their political views and preferences.
201
  Expressing political beliefs 
through the nominee on the ballot, as opposed to using another fo-
rum, does not change the “essential expressive nature” of the 
speech.
202
  Second, fusion allows minor parties to express the party’s 
platform and principles to the electorate in the most effective man-
ner.
203
  Conversely, the State would argue that the ballot is for the 
purpose of electing officials;
204
 thus, voting and appearing on the bal-
lot as a candidate should not constitute an expressive act.
205
 
a. A Voter’s Right of Free Expression 
New Jersey’s anti-fusion law prevents a voter from using the bal-
lot as an expression of minor party support, of support for certain 
policies, and of a political message, namely dissatisfaction with the 
major parties.
206
  The New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledges the 
expressive nature of a voter, as a party member, selecting a candidate 
at the ballot.
207
 
Voters can express messages and beliefs through fusion voting 
that are otherwise unavailable to them by voting for a candidate on a 
major party ticket or by voting for a third party candidate with no 
chance of winning.  For example, fusion allows voters to explicitly 
 
 200 Berger, supra note 8, at 1393–94, 1394 n.94.  See generally Winkler, supra note 18 
(arguing for the development of a Federal Constitutional doctrine protecting the 
right to vote as a means of individual expression). 
 201 See Berger, supra note 8, at 1393.  
 202 See id. at 1414. 
 203 See id. at 1394. 
 204 See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 369 (1997) (noting 
that the “function of elections is to elect candidates”); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 
428, 438 (1992). 
 205 See Timmons, 520 U.S. at 363 (A party does not have an inherent “right to use 
the ballot itself to send a particularized message, to its candidate and to the voters, 
about the nature of its support for the candidate.”). 
 206 See Hynes v. Oradell, 331 A.2d 277, 281 (N.J. 1975) (Pashman, J., dissenting) 
(“The right of candidates to make their positions known to the voters, and of voters 
to express their views on public issues to candidates for and holders of elective office 
is the very substance of the democratic process.”), rev’d, Hynes v. Mayor and Council 
of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976); see also Berger, supra note 8, at 1414 (“By preventing 
parties and their supporters from nominating their selected candidates, anti-fusion 
laws run afoul of a long tradition of state protection for voter participation as ex-
pressed through political parties.”). 
 207 See Wene v. Meyner, 98 A.2d 573, 577 (N.J. 1953) (“A primary, after all, is a 
medium for expressing the preferences of those united under the party standard . . . 
.”). 
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declare that while they support a particular candidate, they want that 
candidate to govern more progressively or conservatively than a typi-
cal major party candidate or that they want the candidate to support 
a specific policy ideal espoused by the minor party.
208
  Thus, a voter is 
not just casting a ballot but also expressing and supporting a clear po-
litical agenda that he wants the candidate to follow in office.  Fusion 
voting lets voters who are dissatisfied with the major parties indicate 
and express those views, while simultaneously retaining the ability to 
vote for a candidate who may ultimately be successful.
209
 
Fusion voting gives individual voters, collectively, the opportuni-
ty to reach a greater audience with their message because the vote to-
tal that each candidate receives from a party’s ballot communicates 
the voters’ reasoning for choosing that candidate.  Even in the un-
likely event that the message does not reach the general public, it will 
surely reach the elected official who beats his opponent with a victory 
margin less than the number of expressive votes the minor party’s 
members cast.  The official will later have to represent and acknowl-
edge the party’s and its members’ interests.
210
  Without fusion voting, 
it is significantly more difficult and less efficient for a voter and a par-
ty to express their message and political beliefs. 
b. A Minor Party’s Right of Free Expression 
The right to nominate one candidate to serve as the public face 
of the party “is inescapably an expressive right”
211
— and arguably a 
party’s most expressive statement
212
— in addition to an associational 
 
 208 Voting for a third party candidate in a non-fusion system also can express this 
message; but it does not do so efficiently.  The two major parties, and their elected 
officials, have no incentive to listen to the expressions of voters who cast a protest 
vote for a minor party candidate.  These minor party candidates pose no threat to 
the two-party system and consequently the voters’ expression has no subsequent ef-
fect on policy making or governance. 
 209 See Timmons, 520 U.S. at 381 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 210 In Oregon, the Democratic Party resisted the fusion bill that was eventually 
signed into law.  Mapes, supra note 106.  The executive director of the state party 
based his opposition, in part, on the fact that minor parties could extract compro-
mises on legislation and issues from a candidate in exchange for the minor party’s 
endorsement.  See id.  This fear of compromising is certainly well-founded because 
compromise to achieve policy goals is one of the purposes of minor parties in a fu-
sion system.  See discussion supra notes 28, 38 and accompanying text.  The executive 
director’s comment also demonstrates how fusion voting is political expression.  
 211 Timmons, 520 U.S. at 373 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 212 See N.J. Conservative Party, Inc. v. Farmer, 735 A.2d 1189, 1193 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 
App. Div. 1999) (“‘A political party is an association of persons sponsoring ideas of 
government, or maintaining certain political principles or beliefs in public policies of 
government, and its purpose is to urge adoption and execution of such principles in govern-
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right.
213
  The right of a political party is the collective rights of voters 
who have gathered for the explicit reason to engage in political ex-
pression in a manner louder and more efficient than an individual 
voter can do on his own.
214
  As a result of New Jersey’s anti-fusion law, 
a minor party is unable to send a message to the voters about its de-
sired standard bearer.
215
  A party must be able to express its belief 
through its desired standard bearer, not a second choice representa-
tive.
216
 
New Jersey realizes the importance of expressing shared beliefs 
through a candidate on the ballot
217
 and acknowledges that parties 
are interest groups that advance political ideas.
218
  New Jersey recog-
nizes the rights involved when a party and its members express their 
beliefs through the nomination process,
219
  which is contrary to the 
approach that Timmons took in declaring that parties exist solely to 
elect candidates.
220
 
 
mental affairs through officers of like beliefs.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Rogers v. State 
Comm. of the Republican Party, 282 A.2d 852, 855 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1967))); 
see also Lesniak v. Budzash, 626 A.2d 1073, 1076 (N.J. 1993) (“‘The selection of no-
minees by political parties plays a crucial role in the electoral system.  Indeed, the 
nomination of candidates by the major parties has been called the ‘most critical 
stage’ of the electoral process.’” (quoting Developments in the Law—Elections, 88 HARV. 
L. REV. 1111, 1151 (1975))). 
 213 Timmons, 520 U.S. at 373 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Demo-
cratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 224 (1989)). 
 214 See Berger, supra note 8, at 1412. 
 215 See Brief for Respondent, supra note 16, at *25 (“[T]he fusion ban interferes 
with the message sent to voters by the party, in the voting booth, that it has nomi-
nated a particular candidate, and it does so despite the fact that the State otherwise 
uses its ballot system for precisely this purpose.”). 
 216 See Timmons, 520 U.S. at 371 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The fact that [a party] 
may nominate its second choice surely does not diminish the significance of a restric-
tion that denies it the right to have the name of its first choice appear on the bal-
lot.”). 
 217 See Smith v. Penta, 405 A.2d 350, 356 (N.J. 1979). 
 218 See, e.g., id.; Friedland v. State, 374 A.2d 60, 65 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1977) 
(quoting Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837, 845 (D. Conn. 1976)).  Minor parties 
introduce new issues into the political debate dominated by the major parties.  See 
Berger, supra note 8, at 1385–86.  This forces the major parties to broaden their own 
base and reach out to voters outside the party and to listen to and incorporate those 
voters’ issues and concerns.  In turn, the minor party members increase accountabili-
ty among officials elected through a fusion ticket.  See id. at 1386.  Fusion gives voters 
the ability to determine which policies they prefer in a much more nuanced manner, 
enabling a candidate to know which policy has more public support.  See Kirschner, 
supra note 14, at 702 (citing Swamp v. Kennedy, 950 F.2d 383, 389 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(Ripple, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)).  
 219 See Lesniak v. Budzash, 626 A.2d 1073, 1080 (N.J. 1993). 
 220 Timmons, 520 U.S. at 363. 
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Parties are more than just vehicles or an avenue by which a can-
didate can win election.  Parties serve a public interest by expressing 
ideals and philosophies.  This expression is inherent in the nature of 
the party itself.  The main way that parties express their views is by 
nominating a candidate.  Parties that advance particular views further 
strengthen the marketplace of ideas, which is the backbone of a ro-
bust democracy.  Thus, the right of a minor party to “disseminate its 
message cannot be minimized.”
221
  While a party’s platform expresses 
a party’s entire views, very few people would read or have knowledge 
of the specifics of a platform.  A significantly larger number, however, 
would be able to associate a candidate with a political party.
222
 
The State’s counterargument is that a ban on fusion does not re-
strict a party’s expressive rights because the party can still endorse a 
candidate, even if the candidate does not appear on the minor party’s 
line on the ballot.
223
  Additionally, a campaign provides an outlet to 
express political beliefs and ideas, and a party does not need a ballot 
to express itself and its views.
224
  New Jersey’s anti-fusion statute only 
reduces the pool of potential candidates a party can nominate by a 
few people, making the prohibition a minimal, if not unnoticeable, 
infringement upon minor parties’ expressive rights.
225
  In this man-
ner, a restriction on expression exists, but the party still has the ability 
to express its views to the public by nominating another candidate. 
This narrow view, however, defeats the main point of parties se-
lecting nominees.  The right to endorse does not equate to the right 
to nominate a candidate.  Newspaper editorial boards, unions, and 
organizations endorse candidates; political parties are the only asso-
ciations who can nominate.
226
  An endorsement is not nearly as po-
werful of a tool of expression as having a candidate appear on the 
ballot. 
Not being able to nominate the candidate of choice stifles the 
party’s message because minor parties generally only have limited re-
sources and will not be able to reach as wide of an audience as they 
could if the general public read the minor parties’ name next to a 
 
 221 Council of Alt. Political Parties v. State, 781 A.2d 1041, 1048 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2001). 
 222 See Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 220 (1986) (“[T]he identifica-
tion of candidates with particular parties plays a role in the process by which voters 
inform themselves for the exercise of the franchise.”). 
 223 See Timmons, 520 U.S. at 361, 363. 
 224 See id. at 361, 363. 
 225 See id. at 363. 
 226 See id. at 373 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The right to be on the election ballot is 
precisely what separates a political party from any other interest group.”). 
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major party candidate’s name on the ballot.
227
  Nominating a candi-
date informs the public more effectively than a simple endorsement 
because every voter will see the ballot, but not every voter will learn of 
an endorsement. 
The costs for a minor party to endorse a major party candidate—
to achieve a level of expression as effective as a nomination on the 
ballot—are an impermissible condition on the exercise of expressive 
rights.  In New Jersey, even a nominal fee may amount to an imper-
missible condition on the exercise of expressive rights.
228
  In 2001, the 
New Jersey Appellate Division ordered the State to provide voter in-
formation for free to minor parties, just as it did for the two major 
parties, despite the nominal cost for minor parties to reproduce the 
voter lists, because imposing a fee unjustly burdened the rights of the 
minor parties.
229
 
Paying to effectively disseminate and advertise an endorsement 
in New Jersey is prohibitive and certainly not nominal, especially in 
light of the substantially cheaper cost of obtaining a place on the bal-
lot and given the immensely expensive nature of political advertising 
in the state.
230
  The cost of placing a candidate on the ballot is limited 
to whatever funds are necessary to gather the requisite signatures to 
qualify as a candidate—the State then bears the cost of printing and 
mailing a sample ballot to every registered voter.  
3. The Right to Vote and the Right of Voter Choice 
New Jersey’s ban on fusion voting eliminates any voter choice as 
to the party line on which the voter should cast a ballot for the can-
didate.
231
  This is the purpose of the anti-fusion law—prohibiting a 
candidate from securing the nomination of multiple parties inevita-
bly prevents a voter from choosing the party and candidate combina-
tion of his choice.  In determining the constitutionality of the anti-
 
 227 See id. 
 228 See Council of Alt. Political Parties v. State, 781 A.2d 1041, 1051 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2001) (citing Green Party v. Hartz Mt. Indus., 752 A.2d 315, 332 (N.J. 
2000)). 
 229 Id. 
 230 See Paul Steinhauser, Game on in New Jersey, CNN POLITICALTICKER (June 3, 2009, 
9:46 AM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2009/06/03/game-on-in-new-jersey; 
see also Hot Race in New Jersey, WASH. POST, June 14, 1988, at A22 (noting that New Jer-
sey had the second most expensive United States Senate campaign in the country). 
 231 See Smith v. Penta, 405 A.2d 350, 359 (N.J. 1979) (Pashman, J., dissenting) (ar-
guing that New Jersey’s closed primary system “violates the imperative of voter free-
dom” because it prevents a voter from choosing to vote in a party’s primary without 
first being a member of that party). 
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fusion statute, the question pursuant to the New Jersey Constitution is 
whether a voter has the right of choice to vote for any qualified can-
didate on any political party line on which the candidate wishes to 
run. 
The right to vote in New Jersey “has taken its place among [the 
state’s] great values.”
232
  New Jersey courts have a long history of in-
terpreting the right to vote to include the right of choice.
233
 
If the Legislature attempts to restrict the choice of a candidate 
who is qualified to hold the office by any party or group of voters, 
“it may at least be doubted whether it has not infringed a constitu-
tional right of voters to have a free and untrammeled expression 
of their choice.”
234
 
The right to vote and the right of voter choice, however, are not nec-
essarily equal.
235
 
The voter choice right has not been litigated yet as a basis for 
third-party access, but post-Samson it can serve as a solid legal founda-
tion for minor parties.
236
  In N.J. Democratic Party v. Samson, the New 
 
 232 Gangemi v. Rosengard, 207 A.2d 665, 667 (N.J. 1965). 
 233 See, e.g., id. (“[T]he right to vote would be empty indeed if it did not include 
the right of choice for whom to vote.”); Comm. to Recall Robert Menendez from the 
Office of U.S. Senator v. Wells, 7 A.3d 720, 754 (N.J. 2010) (Rivera-Soto, J., dissent-
ing) (referring to the “[New Jersey Supreme] Court’s longstanding fidelity to the 
principles that serve to safeguard the right of the people to choose by whom they 
shall be governed”); Smith v. Penta, 405 A.2d 350, 359 (N.J. 1979) (Pashman, J., dis-
senting) (“Without the option to choose, the vote itself is devoid of practical signific-
ance.”); Alston v. Mays, 378 A.2d 72, 76 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1977) (“It is not the 
right to vote which is the underpinning of our democratic process; rather, it is the 
right of choice for whom to vote.”); see also  N.J. Democratic Party v. Samson, 814 
A.2d 1028, 1034 (N.J. 2002) (“The right of choice as integral to the franchise itself . . 
. is grounded in the core values of the democratic system . . . .”); Matthews v. Atlantic 
City, 417 A.2d 1011, 1016 (N.J. 1980) (“In general, an individual’s freedom of choice 
in exercising his franchise is a fundamentally important interest.”); Quaremba v. Al-
lan, 334 A.2d 321, 326 (N.J. 1975); Sadloch v. Allan, 135 A.2d 173, 176 (N.J. 1957); 
Imbrie v. Marsh, 68 A.2d 761, 764 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1949), aff’d, 71 A.2d 352 
(N.J. 1950); In re City Clerk of Paterson, 88 A. 694, 695–96 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1913); State 
v. Black, 24 A. 489, 493 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1892), aff’d sub nom., Ransom v. Black, 51 A. 
1109 (N.J. 1893). 
 234 Gansz v. Johnson, 75 A.2d 831, 832 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1950) (quoting In 
re City Clerk of Paterson, 88 A. 694, 696 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1913)). 
 235 See Gangemi v. Rosengard, 207 A.2d 665, 667 (N.J. 1965). 
 236 Voter choice as a right was recently addressed in another context by the dissent 
in Committee to Recall Robert Menendez from Office.  Relying on Samson, the dissent re-
ferred to the New Jersey Supreme Court’s recognition of “the rights of the people to 
have a choice about who shall govern them.”  Comm. to Recall Robert Menendez, 7 A.3d 
at 777 (Rivera-Soto, J., dissenting) (citing Samson, 814 A.2d at 1033).  The majority, 
however, did not address the voter choice part of the dissent’s argument on the me-
rits; rather the New Jersey Supreme Court dismissed it as immaterial, reasoning that 
when the Federal Constitution preempts a New Jersey law, then the court is not in a 
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Jersey Supreme Court endorsed a very robust right for a voter to have 
a choice on the ballot when it ruled that the State must allow the 
Democratic Party to put forth a substitute candidate to replace then-
Senator Robert Torricelli in the general election.
237
 
The right of voter choice generally arises in New Jersey from ei-
ther legislatively imposed qualifications for office that prevent a can-
didate from running, thereby limiting the number of qualified can-
didates and infringing upon a voter’s choice in selecting a 
candidate,
238
 or a failure to adequately substitute a candidate, which 
deprives a voter of choice at the ballot.
239
  On the other hand, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court has held that the Legislature can limit a 
voter’s choice by enacting a closed primary system
240
 and by prevent-
ing a candidate who has lost a bid for the primary nomination of a 
major party from running as a petition candidate in the general elec-
tion, through so-called “sore-loser statutes.”
241
 
 
position to apply broader constitutional rights under the New Jersey Constitution.  
Id. at 749 (majority opinion). 
 237 See Samson, 814 A.2d at 1036 (quoting Catania v. Haberle, 588 A.2d 374, 376 
(N.J. 1991)); see also Paul Mulshine, Op-Ed, Independents on the Ballot: New Jersey’s the 
Third World for Third Parties, STAR-LEDGER, Nov. 1, 2009, at 16 (predicting that certain 
restrictive third party ballot access laws are susceptible to challenges under the voter 
choice theory proffered in Samson). 
Voter choice, in light of Samson, has also been viewed as a method of statutory 
construction and categorized as part of “The Democracy Canon.”  See generally Ri-
chard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REV. 69, 106–10 (2009) (discussing 
Samson and the Democracy Canon).  The statutory construction view, however, only 
looks at one branch of the right to voter choice—substituting a replacement candi-
date onto the ballot, evidenced by Samson and its predecessors.   It does not account 
for the second branch, which is more rights-oriented and focuses on overly burden-
some candidate-qualification regulations that inhibit the number of candidates run-
ning, thereby reducing voter choice.  See infra note 238 and accompanying text. 
 238 See, e.g., Matthews v. Atlantic City, 417 A.2d 1011, 1020 (N.J. 1980) (noting that 
strict candidate qualification requirements limited the number of candidates and 
thus indirectly reduced voter choice); Gangemi, 207 A.2d 665, 669 (holding that a 
two-year registration requirement to be eligible for office was unconstitutional be-
cause, as an overly restrictive qualification, it reduced the number of eligible candi-
dates and burdened the voters’ choice). 
 239 See, e.g., Samson, 814 A.2d at 1042 (holding that replacing the Democratic can-
didate for Senate with another candidate was necessary to “to ensure an opportunity 
for voters to exercise their right of choice” in the general election); Catania v. Ha-
berle, 588 A.2d 374, 376 (N.J. 1990); Fulbrook v. Reynolds, 698 A.2d 565, 567–68 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1997). 
 240 See Smith v. Penta, 405 A.2d 350, 356–57 (N.J. 1979). 
 241 See Sadloch v. Allan, 135 A.2d 173, 179 (N.J. 1957). 
MONGIELLO_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/16/2011  3:01 PM 
2011] COMMENT 1153 
Prohibiting fusion voting does not infringe on a voter’s right to 
freely choose a candidate.
242
  The voter still has the choice to vote for 
his desired candidate, which is what the jurisprudence in the area 
protects.  New Jersey has not yet established a voter’s right of choice 
to vote for his desired candidate on a specific party line.  In fact, by 
upholding a closed primary, the State has shown that the Legislature 
can restrict a voter’s choice as for which party he may vote. 
Furthermore, the anti-fusion law does not eliminate voter choice 
by decreasing the number of eligible candidates on the ballot.  The 
ban only prevents certain candidates from appearing on multiple 
lines of the ballot as the nominee of multiple parties, thereby solely 
limiting “the universe of potential candidates who may appear on the 
ballot” as a nominee of a certain party.
243
  The ban does not keep a 
candidate off the ballot in the first place, nor does it limit the num-
ber of eligible qualified candidates. 
C. State Interests that New Jersey’s Ban on Fusion Voting Furthers 
The State’s interests in prohibiting fusion will be weighed 
against the constitutionally protected rights of freedom of expression 
and association, pursuant to Article I, paragraphs 6 and 18 of the 
New Jersey Constitution.  The New Jersey Supreme Court will afford 
these rights considerable weight, and the State interests in infringing 
upon the rights must be significant. 
The State will argue that it has the freedom to reasonably regu-
late its own election laws and that prohibiting fusion voting protects 
valid interests, which outweigh any perceived constitutional burdens.  
The New Jersey Legislature has authority to enact reasonable regula-
tion of conduct of primary and general elections.244  Conduct of elec-
tions includes registration of party membership
245
 and qualifications 
for signers of primary nomination petitions.
246
 
The legitimate interests that the State has in banning the cross-
nomination of candidates are—ensuring the integrity, fairness, and 
efficiency of ballots and of the election process; preventing voter con-
 
 242 According to the United States Supreme Court, a fusion law is not a restriction 
on voting because the law does not “restrict the ability of [a party] and its members 
to endorse, support, or vote for anyone they like.”  Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New 
Party, 520 U.S. 351, 363 (1997).  The law, however, does limit a party and its mem-
bers from choosing its standard bearer.  See discussion supra text accompanying note 
174. 
 243 See Timmons, 520 U.S. at 363.  
 244 Wene v. Meyner, 98 A.2d 573, 576 (N.J. 1953). 
 245 E.g., id. 
 246 E.g., Lesniak v. Budzash, 626 A.2d 1073 (N.J. 1993). 
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fusion; preventing frivolous candidacies and overcrowded ballots; 
maintaining a stable political system through the prevention of party 
splintering and disruptions of the two-party system; ensuring that mi-
nor parties have sufficient support before granting them statutory 
party status; and identifying a clear electoral winner.
247
 
1. Ensuring the Integrity, Fairness, and Efficiency of 
Ballots and the Electoral Process 
New Jersey unquestionably has an interest in ensuring the inte-
grity, fairness, and efficiency of ballots and the electoral process.
248
  
The State may enact reasonable laws that prevent electoral distortions 
and ballot manipulations.
249
  The issue for the New Jersey Supreme 
Court to decide is whether prohibiting fusion voting furthers this in-
terest. 
The State has an interest in reasonably regulating the ballot un-
der New Jersey’s current system where candidates can undermine its 
integrity by abusing the candidate slogan provision and the relaxed 
ballot access.
250
  The State will contend that parties and candidates 
can “easily exploit fusion” by creating dummy parties that in turn en-
dorse the candidate, with slogans such as the “‘No New Taxes’” or 
“‘Stop Crime Now’” party, which “would undermine the ballot’s pur-
pose by transforming it from a means of choosing candidates to a 
billboard for political advertising.”
251
 
Nevertheless, the State’s legitimate interest in preventing the 
exploitation of the ballot is not sufficient to justify an infringement 
 
 247 Many of these primary reasons were litigated in Timmons and other fusion cases 
in circuit courts or extrapolated from State interests argued in prior New Jersey elec-
tion and political cases. 
 248 See In re Attorney Gen.’s “Directive on Exit Polling: Media and Non-Partisan 
Public Interest Groups,” 981 A.2d 64, 75 (N.J. 2009); Smith v. Penta, 405 A.2d 350, 
356 (N.J. 1979); Council of Alt. Political Parties v. State, 781 A.2d 1041, 1052 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); see also Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 
351, 364–65 (1997); William E. Baroni, Jr., Administrative Unfeasibility: The Torricelli 
Replacement Case and the Creation of a New Election Law Standard, 27 SETON HALL LEGIS. 
J. 53, 59 (2002) (noting that when New Jersey courts balance the State’s interest in 
regulating the election process against the right to vote, the ultimate question is to 
determine “when is the individual’s right to vote trumped by the need to have order-
ly elections so as to protect the rights of other voters?”). 
 249 For example, New Jersey’s closed primary system is justified because it would 
create “‘false labels’” that would “‘deceive’” voters if a Republican was nominated as 
the Democratic candidate for office.  See Stevenson v. Gilfert, 100 A.2d 490, 493 (N.J. 
1953) (quoting Roberts v. Cleveland, 149 P.2d 120 (N.M. 1944)). 
 250 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:13-4 (West 2010) (allowing a candidate to provide a 
three-word slogan following his name on the ballot); id. § 19:13-5.  
 251 See Timmons, 520 U.S. at 365. 
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upon constitutional rights because the State can prevent such exploi-
tation without banning fusion voting.
252
  If New Jersey is concerned 
about the creation of dummy parties to demonstrate false support for 
a major party candidate, then the Legislature can raise the number of 
petition signatures required for ballot access from the extremely ge-
nerous current standard.
253
  Stringent requirements for ballot access 
and for the creation of parties would effectively prevent any far-
fetched scenario where new parties spring up as puppets of the major 
parties. 
Furthermore, the State will argue that the anti-fusion law ensures 
integrity by promoting candidate competition by reserving limited 
ballot space for opposing candidates.
254
  But competition would ac-
tually increase by making candidates compete for additional nomi-
nations from minor parties in a fusion voting system. 
While New Jersey, undisputedly, has the authority to regulate its 
elections to ensure integrity and fairness, a regulation that prohibits 
fusion is unreasonable because integrity and fairness can be achieved 
through reasonable regulations without infringing upon the constitu-
tional rights of free association and expression inherent in a fusion 
system. 
2. Preventing Voter Confusion 
New Jersey, in regulating the electoral process, has an interest in 
avoiding voter confusion.
255
  The State can enact reasonable regula-
tions to prevent confusion among the electorate.
256
  But preventing 
voter confusion as a justification for prohibiting fusion is “meritless 
and severely underestimates the intelligence of the typical voter.”
257
  
New Jersey has recognized the intelligence of voters and declared 
faith in their ability to meaningfully navigate a ballot to find their 
preferred candidate or party by remarking that “[t]hose voters who 
read and think, or care, in even the slightest way, about what to do 
 
 252 See infra Part V.E (discussing ballot access laws in a proposed New Jersey fusion 
statute). 
 253 See Brief for Respondent, supra note 16, at *38; Timmons, 520 U.S. at 376 
(1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 254 See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 173, at *44. 
 255 Council of Alt. Political Parties v. State, 781 A.2d 1041, 1052–53 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2001); see also Timmons, 520 U.S. at 364 (citing Twin Cities Area New Party 
v. McKenna, 73 F.3d 196, 199–200 (8th Cir. 1996)). 
 256 See Wene v. Meyner, 98 A.2d 573, 576–77 (N.J. 1953). 
 257 Timmons, 520 U.S. at 375–76 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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with their vote—other than throw it away—will be able to find their 
candidates” on the ballot.
258
 
Preventing voter confusion rests on a faulty premise that a voter 
will be better informed and less confused if presented with less in-
formation and fewer choices.
259
  Fusion voting can actually enhance a 
voter’s knowledge about the candidates, parties, and issues
260
 by indi-
cating to a voter details about the candidate through the parties that 
nominate him;
261
 giving greater indication as to the policies each par-
ty supports, through the political alliances and coalitions formed 
across parties;
262
  and by forcing parties and candidates to clarify their 
positions on narrow issues pushed by the minor parties.  In addition, 
a major party and its candidate send a message rejecting a specific set 
of ideals by declining a cross-nomination with a minor party.
263
 
Moreover, minor parties in New Jersey are not eligible to receive 
a ballot line in the first two columns,
264
 which will lessen voter confu-
sion.  A voter will know that the major party candidates will be in the 
first two columns, and if the voter does not want to (or know how to) 
vote for a fusion ticket, that voter does not need to look past the first 
two columns to cast a ballot. 
New Jersey can take affirmative steps to prevent any minimal 
voter confusion that would arise out of a fusion system with clear bal-
lot instructions printed at the polls and on the sample ballots sent out 
to registered voters before an election.
265
  Thus, the State interest in 
preventing voter confusion does not outweigh an infringement upon 
the constitutional rights of minor parties, voters, and candidates. 
 
 258 See N.J. Conservative Party v. Farmer, 753 A.2d 192, 196 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Ch. Div. 
1999). 
 259 See Fusion Candidacies, supra note 25, at 1322. 
 260 See Brief for Republican National Committee, supra note 176, at *12–13; see also 
Richard A. Clucas, The Oregon Constitution and the Quest for Party Reform, 87 OR. L. REV. 
1061, 1096 (2008) (predicting that fusion voting would increase voter knowledge, 
even if only minimally). 
 261 See Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 220 (1986) (“To the extent that 
party labels provide a shorthand designation of the views of party candidates on mat-
ters of public concern, the identification of candidates with particular parties plays a 
role in the process by which voters inform themselves for the exercise of the fran-
chise.”). 
 262 See Twin Cities Area New Party v. McKenna, 73 F.3d 196, 199–200 (8th Cir. 
1996). 
 263 See Brief for Republican National Committee, supra note 176, at *12–13. 
 264 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:14-12 (West 2010). 
 265 See, e.g., N.J. Democratic Party v. Samson, 814 A.2d 1028, 1033 (N.J. 2002) (or-
dering the Attorney General to send out letters to any voter who had received a sam-
ple or absentee ballot in order to prevent voter confusion regarding the candidate 
substitution on the ballot). 
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3. Preventing Frivolous Candidacies and  
Overcrowded Ballots 
The State will also argue that it must prevent fusion voting be-
cause cross-nominations will lead to an increase in frivolous candida-
cies.
266
  Cross-nominations, however, will lead to fewer total candi-
dates since minor parties will have the option of nominating a major 
party candidate who is already running, in lieu of nominating their 
own candidate.
267
  Fusion voting will strongly encourage minor parties 
not to nominate frivolous candidates but instead to try to forge a rela-
tionship with a major party candidate, given the benefits to third par-
ties if they can successfully help elect a major party candidate.
268
 
New Jersey has a history of frivolous candidates running in state-
wide and district elections.  In statewide elections, New Jersey’s low 
signature requirement strongly encourages minor party and inde-
pendent candidates to run for office.
269
  In the 2009 gubernatorial 
election, twelve candidates, including ten petition candidates, ran for 
governor, spanning two rows on a ballot; yet only one petition candi-
date had enough support to qualify for the debates.
270
  The State has 
not taken any action to reduce the number of petition candidates on 
the ballot. 
If the State desires to reduce the number of frivolous candidates, 
it should enact fusion voting, which will encourage minor party can-
didates to cross-nominate major party candidates, rather than sup-
 
 266 See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 364–65 (1997). 
 267 New Jersey voters want there to be fewer candidates on the ballot.  See SUFFOLK 
UNIV., NEW JERSEY STATEWIDE POLL (OCT. 26, 2009) (two-thirds of voters polled stated 
they would have preferred fewer candidates on the 2009 gubernatorial ballot), avail-
able at http://www.suffolk.edu/images/content/fina.edit.New.Jersey.Statewide. 
Tables.Oct.25.2009.pdf. 
 268 For example, in New York, the Working Families Party routinely cross-
nominates progressive Democrats rather than running their own candidates.  Bos-
man, supra note 37, at A28.  The Liberal Party and Conservative Party have not 
fielded serious individual candidates for statewide office in over fifty years, with the 
lone exception coming when the Conservative Party nominated James Buckley for 
the United States Senate who beat the Goldwater Republican, Charles Goodell.  Brief 
of the Conservative Party of New York and Liberal Party of New York, supra note 26, 
at *6–7, *21. 
 269 Even though the signature requirement difference between major and minor 
parties is only two-hundred signatures, the State creates an incentive for minor party 
and independent candidates to run with the lower threshold.  See supra note 152 and 
accompanying text. 
 270 Chris Megerian, The Uninvited: Nine Who Would Be the Next Governor These Candi-
dates Watch from Fringe as Daggett Joins Debate, STAR-LEDGER, Oct. 19, 2009, at 3.  In 
1997, New Jersey had eight independent candidates for governor.  Council of Alt. 
Political Parties v. Hooks, 179 F.3d 64, 77 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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port their own frivolous candidacy.  The State can avoid frivolous 
candidacies and an overcrowded ballot more easily with stricter ballot 
access laws rather than through the prohibition of a voting mechan-
ism that will not increase the total number of candidates. 
4. Maintaining a Stable Political System Through the 
Prevention of PartySplintering and Disruptions of the 
Two-Party System 
Preserving the two-party system was the “true basis” for the Su-
preme Court’s rationale in upholding the anti-fusion statute in Tim-
mons.
271
  The Court declared that a state has an interest in preventing 
party splintering and disruptions of the two-party system.
272
  The 
Court also noted that the two-party system is a legitimate interest as 
long as it is not protected at the “complete[] insulat[ion]” of minor 
parties.
273
  New Jersey has also recognized that the Legislature may de-
termine that the two-party system promotes political stability.
274
 
The New Jersey Appellate Division, however, expressly rejected 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s view in Timmons that “alternative parties 
[are] synonymous with party splintering and excessive factionalism 
which lead to political destabilization.”
275
  Instead, the panel noted 
that minor parties can be “an integral part of the political process.”
276
 
No evidence indicates that fusion voting undermines the two-
party system.  The Republican National Committee, a key stakeholder 
in the two-party system, did not view fusion as a threat to the stability 
of the system and filed an amicus brief on behalf of the New Party in 
Timmons,
277
 even though the New Party endorsed a rival Democratic 
 
 271 Timmons, 520 U.S. at 377 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 272 Id. at 364 (citing Twin Cities Area New Party v. McKenna, 73 F.3d 196, 199–200 
(8th Cir. 1996)).  
 273 Id. at 366–67. 
 274 See N.J. Democratic Party v. Samson, 814 A.2d 1028, 1034–35 (N.J. 2002) (ac-
knowledging that the “‘general intent of the elections laws [is, in part,] to preserve 
the two-party system.’” (quoting Kilmurray v. Gilfert, 91 A.2d 865, 867 (N.J. 1952))).  
Samson, however, discussed preserving the two-party system in order to prevent voters 
from enduring a one-party system and losing their right of voter choice.  The New 
Jersey Supreme Court established that, at a minimum, there must be two parties to 
reflect adequate choice for the voters; the court did not imply that there should be a 
maximum of two parties in the system.  The court even acknowledged the important 
role third parties play in a “robust democracy.”  See id. at 1041. 
 275 Council of Alt. Political Parties v. State, 781 A.2d 1041, 1048 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2001) (citing Timmons, 520 U.S. at 367).  
 276 See id. 
 277 See generally Brief for Republican National Committee, supra note 176.  Filing 
this brief was not in the self-interest of the Republican National Committee.  The 
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Farmer-Labor candidate.
278
  Historically, fusion voting has not destabi-
lized the two-party system.
279
  The New York political system has not 
crumbled with an active fusion voting system.
280
  As a result of fusion, 
a “‘modified two-party system’” develops in which minor parties can 
play a significant role without achieving major party status.
281
 
Fusion voting arguably strengthens the two-party system.
282
  If 
minor parties want to be taken seriously and have their views heard, 
then they will nominate one of the major party candidates.  When 
minor parties have the ability to potentially serve a deciding role by 
pushing a candidate over the top to win an election, the parties will 
take advantage of that opportunity.  Therefore, minor parties will of-
ten nominate major party candidates rather than fielding their own 
candidate.
283
  The more often that minor parties nominate a major 
party candidate, the fewer minor party candidates there are and the 
less chance there is for a third party candidate to surge to victory and 
undermine the two major parties. 
Internal party differences that give rise to splintering are in no 
way prevented by an anti-fusion ban that prevents minor parties from 
 
RNC is a fifty-percent stakeholder in the current two-party system and ascendency of 
third parties would weaken the party’s base of support.  It is hard to imagine that the 
Republican Party would ever advocate for the collapse of the two-party system or for 
policies that would severely undermine its stability.  Yet the Republican Party filed a 
brief in support of minor parties’ associational rights to participate in fusion voting. 
 278 But see Council of Alt. Political Parties, 781 A.2d at 1044.  In Council of Alternative 
Political Parties, the Democratic and Republican State Committees both intervened as 
defendants in a suit against a coalition of minor parties that demanded that New Jer-
sey’s registration form contain an option for a voter to register with a minor party.  
Id.; Robert Schwanberg, Third Parties Sue to get Ballot-Law Break, STAR-LEDGER, Feb. 2, 
1999, at 15. 
 279 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 280 See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 375 n.3 (1997) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he parade of horribles that the majority appears to believe 
might visit Minnesota should fusion candidacies be allowed is fantastical, given the 
evidence from New York’s experience with fusion.” (citing Brief of the Conservative 
Party of New York and Liberal Party of New York, supra note 26, at *20–25)).  See gen-
erally Richard L. Hasen, Entrenching the Duopoly: Why the Supreme Court Should Not Allow 
the States to Protect the Democrats and Republicans from Political Competition, 1997 SUP. CT. 
REV. 331 (1997). 
 281 Berger, supra note 8, at 1406 (quoting DANIEL A. MAZMANIAN, THIRD PARTIES IN 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 115 (1974)). 
 282 See Timmons, 520 U.S. at 382, n.11 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“‘Rather than jeo-
pardizing the integrity of the election system, consensual multiple party nomination 
may invigorate it by fostering more competition, participation, and representation in 
American politics.’” (quoting Twin Cities Area New Party v. McKenna, 73 F.3d 196, 
199 (8th Cir. 1996))). 
 283 See discussion supra notes 267–68 and accompanying text. 
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working with other parties.
284
  By definition, fusion voting encom-
passes an outside minor party’s decision to cross-nominate a major 
party candidate.  Fusion does not depend on a major party making 
any decisions that could give rise to splintering. 
If New Jersey wants to maintain the two-party system (which is 
within its prerogative even though certain laws seem to undermine 
that desire
285
), it can do so without infringing upon the freedoms of 
association and political expression of voters and minor parties.
286
  In 
weighing the balances, the rights of association and political expres-
sion outweigh the State’s limited interest in protecting the two-party 
system. 
5. Ensuring that Minor Parties Have Sufficient Support 
Before Granting Them Statutory Party Status 
New Jersey has a valid interest in ensuring that any party that 
achieves major-party status does so through “bona fide and actual[] 
support[]” and not by developing off of the popularity of a major 
party’s candidate.
287
  Fusion voting could undercut the state’s political 
party classifications
288
 and let minor parties ride the popularity of a 
 
 284 In its Amicus Brief, the Republican National Committee argued that party 
splintering is prevented if the major party has to approve and sign off on any minor 
party nomination of one of its candidates.  Brief for Republican National Committee, 
supra note 176, at *9–11; see also Twin Cities Area New Party, 73 F.3d at 199.  For a dis-
cussion of the merits of this idea in a fusion system, see infra Part.V.1. 
 285 Currently, the New Jersey Legislature does not wholeheartedly protect the two-
party system in other areas of the election laws.  The State gives minor parties bene-
fits that could theoretically undermine the two-party system, such as requiring a ma-
jor party to hold a primary while allowing a minor party to access the ballot through 
petition and providing a discrepancy in the signatory requirement in state elections.  
See supra notes 152, 154 and accompanying text. 
 286 Winner-take-all districts and no proportional voting, for example, help solidify 
two-party support.  See Gregory P. Magarian, Regulating Political Parties Under a “Public 
Rights” First Amendment, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1939, 2056–57 (2003).  Raising the 
signature requirements for petition candidacies would also strengthen the two-party 
system.  See discussion infra Part V.E.  
 287 See Timmons, 520 U.S. at 366 (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 
n.9 (1983); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 733, 746 (1974)).  The Timmons Court’s 
logic rests on the arguably faulty premise that support for a major party candidate, 
through a minor party’s nomination, is not bona fide or actual support for that party.  
A minor party is not trying to improve itself at the expense of or riding the coattails 
of the status of a major party’s candidate—rather the minor party is trying to asso-
ciate with that candidate and hold him out as one of the party’s own.  Id. at 376 n.5 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 288 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:1-1 (West 2010).  See supra text accompanying notes 
62–65 for a discussion of New Jersey’s requirements to classify as a statutory political 
party and what it entails. 
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major party candidate to gain statutory “political party” status without 
legitimate support.
289
 
The State will argue that if fusion votes count towards the requi-
site party support to classify as a political party, then it will distort the 
minor party’s actual level of support.  Voters may choose to vote for a 
candidate on a minor party line for the sole purpose of sending a 
message or boycotting the two major parties, but without any intent 
of supporting the minor party’s platform or views.  Additionally, a 
voter may simply vote for a fusion candidate on the first party line he 
sees, regardless of which party it is.
290
  In practice though, a voter who 
just wants to support a candidate regardless of the party line will likely 
vote under the major party line, not the minor party line, thereby re-
ducing the chance of the minor party garnering false support. 
Becoming a statutory party allows that party to hold a primary 
and guarantees it a ballot line.
291
  Given the immense benefits in-
volved with achieving political party status, New Jersey uses a high 
threshold for third parties to obtain the status.  The 10% support re-
quirement to becoming an official party is stricter than the require-
ment in a large majority of other states.
292
  The law requires 10% 
statewide, not just in a given district.
293
  In light of the high threshold, 
nothing indicates that reinstating fusion voting would assure minor 
parties a guaranteed 10% of the vote across the state in order to 
achieve political party status. 
The 10% support requirement to qualify as a statutory political 
party is a reasonable regulation by the Legislature.
294
  While New Jer-
sey has an interest in only granting statutory status to parties with bo-
 
 289 See Timmons, 520 U.S. at 366.  This view may also be representative of New Jer-
sey’s two major parties’ line of thinking.  In explaining why the Democratic State 
Committee intervened as a defendant in a suit brought by minor parties seeking the 
ability to register voters as members of a minor party, the State Democratic Chair-
man remarked that, “‘[a] party should earn its way into the electoral system, not have 
it handed to them.’”  Schwanberg, supra note 278, at 15 (discussing Council of Alt. 
Political Parties v. State, 781 A.2d 1041 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001)). 
 290 This issue though is not a significant problem considering the two major par-
ties must occupy the first two lines on the ballot in New Jersey.  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
19:14-12 (West 2010). 
 291 See discussion supra Part II.C.1. 
 292 See Schwanberg, supra note 278, at 15.  In the twentieth century, New Jersey was 
the only state that did not have a minor party qualify for a ballot line.  Mulshine, su-
pra note 237, at 16 (“The nearest parallel to our [ballot access] laws is perhaps in 
Russia, where Vladimir Putin makes his opponents in Moscow show support in Sibe-
ria if they wish to oppose him.”). 
 293 § 19:1-1; see also Council of Alt. Political Parties v. State, 781 A.2d 1041 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); Mulshine, supra note 237, at 16. 
 294 See Council of Alt. Political Parties, 781 A.2d. at 1045. 
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na fide support, the State can ensure party support is genuine in a 
more narrowly tailored manner, such as raising the statutory thre-
shold or not counting fusion votes in determining party status, with-
out unconstitutionally burdening the rights of voters and parties.
295
 
6. Identifying the Election Winner 
The State needs to be able to clearly identify the election win-
ner.
296
  This should not be an issue because counting votes would not 
fundamentally change under a fusion system—a fusion candidate’s 
total support is simply aggregated across all the party lines.  If a can-
didate receives two votes on two party lines, the vote would still only 
count once.
297
 
D. New Jersey’s Ban on Fusion Voting Violates the State Constitution 
The New Jersey anti-fusion law is unconstitutional because of the 
undue burden it places on the associational rights of candidates and 
minor parties and the expressional rights of voters and minor parties.  
The State’s interests in upholding the ban—ensuring ballot integrity 
and bona fide party support prior to granting political party status—
are not sufficient to justify the infringement upon the freedoms of 
expression and association that voters and minor parties are forced to 
endure. 
Ensuring ballot integrity is a clear goal for the State.  No evi-
dence indicates, however, that the electoral process will be unfair, in-
efficient, or lack integrity in a fusion system.  Prior state experiences, 
and New York’s current experience, suggest that fusion does not un-
dermine electoral stability.  The history of anti-fusion laws demon-
strates that the bans were enacted not to protect the integrity of elec-
tions, but rather for the major party in power to quell any opposition 
from minor parties.
298
  The guise of protecting the electoral process is 
not a compelling interest that outweighs the infringement of the 
fundamental political rights of association and expression. 
Furthermore, a ban on fusion voting is a broad and unreasona-
ble response to New Jersey’s interest in ensuring that parties receive 
 
 295 See infra Part V.C (discussing a proposed fusion statute and the merits of these 
restrictions). 
 296 See Twin Cities Area New Party v. McKenna, 73 F.3d 196, 199–200 (8th Cir. 
1996). 
 297 Counting two votes would violate the constitutional principle of “one person, 
one vote.”  Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).  For a discussion of which party 
should receive the vote tally in a fusion system, see infra Part V.D. 
 298 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
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bona fide support before assuming statutory party status.  The State, 
if it so desires, can easily regulate a fusion voting system in such a way 
as to prevent minor parties from reaching statutory party status based 
on spurious support.  For example, New Jersey can refuse to count 
votes for cross-nominated candidates toward the statutory political 
party requirements or the Legislature can raise the current level of 
support necessary to achieve party status.
299
  Therefore, the significant 
associational and expressive rights of individuals and parties outweigh 
the State’s interest in ensuring that political parties achieve bona fide 
support, which New Jersey can achieve with other less obtrusive regu-
lations. 
V. PROPOSED FUSION STATUTE 
Once the New Jersey Supreme Court finds the state’s fusion ban 
unconstitutional, then the Legislature should enact reasonable regu-
lations that ensure the associational and expressional rights of voters 
and parties, as well as protect the State’s interests in conducting or-
derly elections.
300
  The Legislature should do this with an affirmative 
grant providing for fusion voting as opposed to impliedly accepting 
fusion through the absence of laws prohibiting it.
301
  An affirmative 
grant prevents any ambiguity in the election statute regarding the use 
of fusion
302
 and explicitly protects the right of fusion voting.
303
  A pro-
posed statute to ensure fusion voting while protecting various State 
interests should read as follows: 
 
 299 See discussion infra Part V.C. 
 300 State regulation of a fusion system will necessarily infringe slightly on parties as 
other election regulations do, however, the proposed statute will not unconstitution-
ally limit rights as the anti-fusion law currently does.  
 301 For example, Connecticut explicitly grants a right for fusion voting.  CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 9-453t (2010) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit 
any candidate from appearing on the ballot as the nominee of two or more major or 
minor parties for the same office.”). 
 302 Some states technically allow fusion voting in unusual circumstances.  Califor-
nia, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire “nominally permit fusion if a candidate wins 
election via write-in votes in a primary for a party of which the candidate is not a 
member, but that possibility is so remote as to be irrelevant for practical purposes.”  
MORSE & GASS, supra note 15, at 3. 
 303 See, e.g., S.C. Green Party v. S.C. State Election Comm’n, 647 F. Supp. 2d 602 
(D.S.C. 2009) (finding that South Carolina does not necessarily promote fusion as a 
policy because there is no statute providing for the scheme, only cases and an attor-
ney general’s opinion), aff’d, 612 F.3d 752 (4th Cir. 2010).  “The court recognizes 
that the practice of fusion candidacies is accepted in South Carolina.  The court will 
not, however, interpret those sources to mean that South Carolina has a policy of 
promoting fusion.”  Id. at 617. 
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A candidate for the general election may accept the nomination 
of more than one party and appear on the ballot on multiple par-
ty lines, provided that: 
(A) The nominating party and the candidate consent to the 
cross-nomination; 
(B) The candidate has not previously lost another party’s 
nomination; 
(C) Votes for a party that engages in cross-nomination pur-
suant to this section, count towards the 10% voter-
support threshold to achieve “political party status,” as 
defined by section 19:1-1, only if the party achieves the 
requisite 10% of the vote in two out of the three preced-
ing elections; 
(D) A voter, who selects the name of a candidate on the ballot 
on multiple party lines, shall have his vote count only 
once towards that candidate’s total votes, but no party 
shall receive credit for said vote. 
No other provision in this section shall be construed as prohibit-
ing a candidate from appearing on the ballot as a nominee of 
more than one party. 
A. The Nominating Party and the Candidate Consent  
to the Cross-Nomination 
If either the candidate or the nominating party objects to the 
cross-nomination, then the State should not recognize or allow the 
fusion ticket to proceed.  New Jersey may consider requiring that the 
major party itself give its consent before the cross-nomination is al-
lowed.
304
  The concern behind major party consent is that a losing fac-
tion within its own party might break off and nominate the major 
party candidate on a newly created minor party solely to re-raise the 
issues discussed and decided in the primary election.
305
 
B. Sore-Loser Provision 
The New Jersey Supreme Court has already upheld the statute 
preventing a candidate who sought a primary nomination from later 
seeking a petition nomination.
306
  This law also had the effect of pro-
hibiting fusion.
307
  If fusion is allowed, some version of the sore-loser 
 
 304 See Brief for Republican National Committee, supra note 176, at *3, *9–11. 
 305 Id.; Kirschner, supra note 14, at 718 (Involuntary fusion “subjects the internal 
decisions of political parties to the potentially destructive designs of forces external 
to these parties.”).  This concern can be remedied with the revised sore-loser provi-
sion.  See infra Part V.B. 
 306 See Sadloch v. Allan, 135 A.2d 173, 178–79 (N.J. 1957). 
 307 See discussion supra note 74 and accompanying text.  
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statute should remain.  A situation in which a major party candidate 
loses its primary nomination and then subsequently forms another 
party to receive that nomination essentially replays the primary con-
test during the general election.
308
  The purpose of fusion voting is to 
allow minor parties to associate with major party candidates and to 
give their members an opportunity to express their political views 
while simultaneously voting for a candidate with a chance of winning 
the office.  Fusion is not a mechanism to give a candidate who lost his 
party’s primary nomination a backdoor way of obtaining ballot access. 
New Jersey can implement a statute that prevents a candidate 
who has already lost a nomination from seeking ballot access through 
an alternate route.
309
  This will prevent intra-party battles from being 
rehashed.  A candidate cannot lose a primary contest, and then raise 
those same issues again in the general election under the banner of a 
minor party. 
C. Statutory Political Party 
Requiring the support of 10% of the electorate for two out of 
the previous three elections rather than solely the last election (as the 
State currently requires
310
) will force a minor party to demonstrate 
continued support across multiple elections in order to achieve “po-
litical party” status.  This provision will allow New Jersey to keep its al-
ready high 10% threshold, while simultaneously advancing the State 
interest in preventing a minor party from riding the support of one 
candidate to statutory political party status.
311
 
 
 308 See Brief for Republican National Committee, supra note 176, at *3, *9–11. 
 309 Preventing a candidate who lost from seeking another nomination is true to 
the purpose of a “sore-loser” statute.  New Jersey should not adopt a harsh sore-loser 
statute, like South Carolina’s, which the state keeps in place for cross-nominations on 
a fusion ticket—preventing a candidate who wins two minor party nominations, but 
later loses the major party primary election, from being eligible to appear on the bal-
lot as a nominee of either party.  See S.C. Green Party v. S.C. State Election Comm’n, 
647 F. Supp. 2d 602, 614–16 (D.S.C. 2009), aff’d 612 F.3d 752 (4th Cir. 2010); 1970 
S.C. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 2933; S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-11-10 (2009).     
 310 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:1-1 (West 2010). 
 311 Not counting fusion tickets for party support, as an alternate means of achiev-
ing this goal, will also affect the major parties that have candidates running on fusion 
tickets because the major parties must demonstrate voter-support every election as 
well. 
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D. Multiple Votes by One Voter 
New Jersey has voting machines that do not allow for a double 
vote.
312
  Thus, this provision is only relevant for New Jersey’s mail-in 
ballots. 
States that allow fusion voting have provisions that dictate what 
happens when a voter votes for the same candidate on more than one 
party line, thereby creating a “double vote,” in order to ensure that a 
vote is properly counted and recorded.  New York used to count a 
double vote in the tally for the candidate, but not the party;
313
 howev-
er, beginning in 2010, New York updated its voting machines and be-
gan to count the vote for the party that appears first on the ballot.
314
  
Connecticut counts the vote for the minor party, believing that if a 
person checked a minor party box in addition to the major party line, 
that voter intended to support the minor party in some way.
315
  New 
Jersey should follow the old New York mechanism, which had served 
the state well in its fusion system, of counting the vote in the candi-
date’s tally but not counting the vote in any party’s total vote count. 
E. Additional Considerations 
The Legislature should also raise the current signature require-
ments to access the ballot.  New Jersey already has very generous bal-
lot access laws, even granting minor parties a relaxed standard in 
statewide races.
316
  The signature requirement should not become re-
strictive, but a candidate should have to demonstrate a modicum of 
support.  Collecting one hundred signatures to petition onto the bal-
lot as a candidate for the State Legislature
317
 does not necessarily es-
tablish support for either the candidate or the party seeking to cross-
nominate him. 
 
 312 § 19:5A-3(f). 
 313 BENJAMIN HEALEY & MYRIAH PAHL, FUSION VOTING: AN ANALYSIS 4 (Demos 2007), 
available at http://archive.demos.org/pubs/fusion_web.pdf. 
 314 N.Y. ELEC. LAW. § 9-112(4) (McKinney 2010).  There is an exception for a gu-
bernatorial race, which follows the old rule of a double vote only counting for a can-
didate and not a party.  Id.  The Conservative Party and the Working Families Party 
sought to enjoin the enforcement of the new counting method as a violation of the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments, but the court dismissed stating that it was too 
close to the election to enter a preliminary injunction and thus did not reach the 
merits of the issue.  Conservative Party of N.Y. v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, No. 10 
Civ. 6923, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114155, at *3, *6–8 (Oct. 15, 2010). 
 315 HEALEY & PAHL, supra note 313, at 4. 
 316 See supra notes 152, 154 and accompanying text. 
 317 § 19:13-5; N.J. DEP’T OF STATE—DIV. OF ELECTIONS, INDEPENDENT CANDIDATE 
REQUIREMENTS, available at http://www.state.nj.us/state/elections/candidate_pdf/ 
independent-candidate-requirements-110410.pdf (last visited March, 15, 2011). 
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Raising the requisite number of signatures to access the ballot 
once fusion voting is allowed accomplishes two objectives for the 
State.  First, it will reduce the number of parties on the ballot.  New 
Jersey already has numerous parties on a ballot in a given race.  Pre-
sumably, fusion voting would entice other third parties to form and 
seek ballot access, thus increasing that total.  Second, moderately 
stricter ballot access laws will reduce the chance of dummy parties 
forming just to support a major candidate.
318
  The concern that minor 
parties would form solely to support a major party candidate does not 
sufficiently justify restricting the minor parties’ constitutional 
rights;
319
 however, it does warrant legislative action to prevent parties 
from forming for the sole purpose of cross-nominating a candidate. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
New Jersey’s anti-fusion law betrays fundamental rights guaran-
teed by the New Jersey Constitution, upon which the New Jersey Su-
preme Court has historically relied to protect robust free speech and 
assembly rights even if directly contrary to federal interpretation pur-
suant to the First Amendment.  The fusion ban preserves the two-
party system without furthering sufficient State interests to justify the 
infringement of a candidate’s and minor party’s associational rights 
and the expressive rights of voters and minor parties. 
The anti-fusion law unconstitutionally restricts the associational 
rights of minor parties and candidates by preventing a party from 
nominating its desired standard bearer.  The fusion ban violates New 
Jersey’s broad constitutional right of free speech by prohibiting a vot-
er from expressing a clear message to candidates and elected officials 
and by preventing a minor party from expressing to the public which 
candidate best represents the party’s deep-rooted beliefs and prin-
ciples. 
At a contentious time in New Jersey politics—when strong parti-
san rhetoric drowns out voter concerns—fusion voting can provide 
voters with real choice and a powerful voice.  New Jersey voters need 
the ability to express their disenchantment with the current state of 
politics and send a message to public officials, candidates, and the po-
litical parties.  As the Star-Ledger noted in its endorsement of an inde-
pendent candidate for governor, “the value of a vote is not limited to 
picking a winner.  The real value lies in the signal it sends about what 
 
 318 See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 365 (1997); see also 
discussion supra text accompanying notes 250–253. 
 319 See discussion supra Part IV.C.1. 
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the voter believes is best for the city, county or state—not merely at 
the moment, but long-term.”
320
 
 
 
 320 Editorial, supra note 1, at 22. 
